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Preface 
The role played by development cooperation in conflict situations has become an 
important topic in the international debate. To study the impact of German devel-
opment cooperation in conflicts and crises, the Federal Ministry for Economic Co-
operation and Development (BMZ) commissioned an evaluation covering six 
countries (Ethiopia, El Salvador, Kenya, Mali, Rwanda and Sri Lanka). Each coun-
try was investigated by groups of experts in teams of two. This study is the sum-
mary (cross-section) report on the six evaluations, which were drawn up as internal 
working documents. 
I would like to take this opportunity to thank everyone with whom I have had dis-
cussions for their cooperation and especially for the pointers and comments re-
ceived at the BMZ, the Federal Foreign Office, the German Agency for Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ), the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) and the experts 
responsible for the various evaluations. 
Berlin, August 1999 Stephan Klingebiel 
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Summary 
Reason for the Study and its Objective 
The early 1990s saw the beginning of an intensive 
international debate on the contribution that de-
velopment cooperation can make to stable and 
peaceful development in conflict situations. Vari-
ous conceptual papers (by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development/OECD's 
Development Assistance Committee/DAC and the 
German Federal Ministry for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development/BMZ among others) have 
meanwhile been published, and some experience 
has been gained at project and programme level. 
So far, however, there have been hardly any em-
pirical studies of the role that development coop-
eration as a whole has played, or might play, in 
conflict situations or of the requirements that must 
be met if it is to make a successful contribution to 
the prevention of violent conflicts. 
The aim of the evaluation of "the impact of devel-
opment cooperation in conflict situations" is to 
examine the role that German development coop-
eration has played in conflicts and crises in the 
past. Both aspects which have defused conflicts 
and aspects which have exacerbated conflicts will 
be considered in this context. Factors indicating 
that development cooperation may well contribute 
to crisis prevention or conflict resolution will be 
identified. Above all, the interaction of the various 
instruments within the overall development coop-
eration framework must be assessed. 
It should be emphasized that conflicts are neces-
sary components of societies; they should not 
therefore be prevented per se. The aim is rather to 
contribute to their peaceful and constructive reso-
lution and to help prevent them from being re-
solved by violent means. 
This study is the summary (cross-section) report 
on six internal country studies (evaluations). The 
cases of Ethiopia, El Salvador, Kenya, Mali, Sri 
Lanka and Rwanda, which represent different 
phases of conflicts, have been studied. Rwanda 
has special features in view of the genocide that 
has occurred there. 
Environment for Development Coopera-
tion in Conflict Situations 
Causes of Conflicts and Effects of Conflict Situa-
tions on Development 
The conflicts studied can be largely attributed – 
albeit with major differences – to (1) rivalry for 
resources and/or (2) the dominance of certain so-
cial groups. These causes often rank high in the 
perception of parties to conflicts. Perception of, 
say, how much discrimination an ethnic group 
suffers or how much preference it enjoys thus fre-
quently determines the behaviour of the actors 
concerned. In many cases ethnic or other lines of 
conflict therefore reflect instrumentalization by 
parties to the conflict. 
Conflict situations are associated not only with 
human suffering and humanitarian aspects but 
also with high development "costs". Acute con-
flicts in the form of civil wars or something simi-
lar are usually the main obstacle to the develop-
ment of a country or region. 
Settlement and De-escalation of Conflicts and Ex-
ternal Influences 
Few general patterns providing clues to the struc-
tures of conflict resolution and de-escalation can 
be identified. Even in case studies that note posi-
tive tendencies over long periods or for some time 
a widespread phenomenon of reversibility and 
fragility can be detected: there is usually continu-
ing uncertainty about steps that might lead or have 
already led to de-escalation and about wars that 
have ended. 
In at least some cases (Mali and El Salvador) the 
following factors played an important part in the 
settlement of conflicts: (1) a no-win situation, (2) 
the high cost of war, (3) external actors had no 
interest in seeing the war continue and (4) at-
tempts at mediation from outside and within. 
What influence external actors have on conflict 
situations differs from one case to another and 
depends partly on the time and the regional envi-
ronment. Although all the conflict situations stud-
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ied were "internal" conflicts or civil wars, almost 
all had something to do with the regional envi-
ronment. 
External actors were sometimes crucially impor-
tant for the course and outcome of conflicts; in 
various cases this also had major repercussions for 
German policy. The USA's massive economic and 
military aid, for example, had a serious influence 
on the civil war in El Salvador. 
External actors' (non-military) attempts to bring 
influence to bear with a view to de-escalating con-
flicts or ending wars – such as attempts at media-
tion and diplomatic pressure – have differed in the 
impacts they have had. Many are likely to have 
been of secondary or subsidiary importance (as in 
the case of Mali and Sri Lanka), but some may 
have been decisive (e.g. in Kenya through efforts 
to advance democratization). 
Conflict Recognition and the Flow of In-
formation 
In principle, information relevant to conflicts can 
be gathered and processed at three levels: (1) at 
project level, (2) at the level of the embassy and 
local development cooperation offices and (3) at 
headquarters level (Foreign Office/FO, BMZ and 
implementing agencies). In some cases the re-
cording, forwarding and processing of information 
proved to be deficient and, to some extent, highly 
problematical (Rwanda). In other cases the system 
worked satisfactorily on the whole. 
In some countries potential sources of conflict had 
been overlooked or underrated, and information 
relevant to conflicts had not been recorded by the 
embassies; in some instances there was a tendency 
to avoid any attitude that was critical of the gov-
ernment. Adequate assessment of information by 
the actors concerned (FO and BMZ) was not al-
ways ensured. 
Conflict situations were often of no real interest to 
development cooperation projects and pro-
grammes or to the implementing agencies unless 
they had a direct impact on the technical imple-
mentation of a measure (safety of the project staff, 
etc.). Conflicts are often perceived as a "disruptive 
factor" over which little influence can be exer-
cised and which the actors involved believe 
should as far as possible be excluded from their 
own development cooperation activities. 
In the recording, forwarding and interpretation of 
information four problems can be identified: (1) 
the system features a wealth of information and, 
above all, inconsistent information; actors may 
tend to eliminate inconsistencies by resorting to 
certain mechanisms (e.g. selective perception) in 
their reporting ("cognitive dissonance"); (2) the 
local structures (projects, German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation/GTZ office, embassy) tend 
to be reluctant to refer to conflict situations; (3) 
projects endeavour to shield themselves from the 
context of the conflict: staff do not want "their" 
project impaired by the unfavourable environ-
ment; (4) development cooperation measures fail 
to forge a link between local conditions and the 
national or regional situation where a conflict is 
concerned. 
From the experience gained in the countries stud-
ied various approaches to improving the flow of 
information within the Federal Government and 
the recognition of conflicts can be identified: a 
review of the ways in which embassies obtain and 
forward information, better conflict recognition 
and forwarding of information by project person-
nel and local development cooperation offices, 
and improved analysis by the BMZ of the ten-
dency of some countries to plunge into crisis 
(utilization of the established indicator model / 
"Spelten indicators"). 
German Development Cooperation in Con-
flict Situations 
German development cooperation pursued very 
different strategies in the countries studied. Two 
patterns of behaviour can generally be distin-
guished in this context: on the one hand, countries 
or phases in which official German development 
cooperation tried to act independently of the ac-
tual or potential conflict. The reactive adjustments 
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due to the conflict that were nonetheless necessary 
and were made in these situations are reflected, 
for example, in the withdrawal of development 
cooperation personnel because of the security 
situation and in the impossibility of measures be-
ing taken in certain parts of the country because of 
civil war. On the other hand, it is possible to iden-
tify countries or individual phases in which Ger-
man development cooperation made a deliberate 
attempt to help prevent crises or resolve conflicts. 
This strategy of explicit sensitivity to conflicts 
takes many different forms, examples being a 
concept or strategy for preventing or resolving 
conflicts (in connection with the country concept, 
for instance), the issues raised during a policy dia-
logue and specific development cooperation 
measures designed to prevent or resolve conflicts. 
In most of the countries studied "mixed conflict 
strategies" which both contain elements of reac-
tive conflict-related adjustments and reveal ex-
plicit sensitivity to conflict had clearly been 
adopted in German development cooperation. 
Such strategies are, however, largely the outcome 
of an evolving process and less the expression of 
explicit strategic planning. 
Explicitly Conflict-related Development Coopera-
tion Measures 
Various explicitly conflict-related projects and 
programmes (measures to demobilize and reinte-
grate combatants, programme packages for the 
social, political and economic stabilization of cer-
tain regions, etc.) of official German development 
cooperation were assisted in most of the countries 
studied. In conflict-related projects a particularly 
heavy commitment is shown by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and espe-
cially the Political Foundations and the Churches 
in the cases studied. The measures taken by NGOs 
differ widely, since some operate in substantive 
spheres and even, in some cases, regions (such as 
areas of Sri Lanka controlled by the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam/LTTE) which are not cov-
ered by official development cooperation. 
Policy Dialogue and Conditionality 
Policy dialogue can be conducted at both bilateral 
and multilateral level. At bilateral level govern-
ment negotiations and consultations and the em-
bassies' on-going dialogue with government agen-
cies provide regular opportunities for concerns to 
be expressed. Visits by leading political figures 
(to the partner country or to Germany) also enable 
topics relevant to conflicts to be raised. There are 
also opportunities for conducting a multilateral 
policy dialogue at the Consultative Group Meet-
ings organized by the World Bank and at the level 
of the European Union, the United Nations and 
other international fora. 
In some cases at least, bilateral relations have 
been seen as an opportunity for conducting a pol-
icy dialogue with a partner government on issues 
relevant to a conflict. In various cases, however, 
policy dialogue has been used to voice general 
criticism rather than impose any explicit condi-
tionality (Sri Lanka and Rwanda being examples 
of this tendency). The policy dialogue entailing 
most conditionality was conducted with Kenya, 
the donor community bringing massive pressure 
to bear on its government. Germany played an 
important part at bilateral level and, as one of the 
leading donors, at international level in ensuring 
that a common international position was adopted. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
As a general rule it can be said that the direct in-
fluence which German development cooperation 
and the whole of the international donor commu-
nity can have on conflict situations is very limited; 
this is particularly true of acute conflicts (open 
confrontation phase). 
On the whole, there has been a discernible ten-
dency in German development cooperation for 
sensitivity to conflict situations to increase in the 
1990s. Despite this positive tendency, develop-
ment cooperation actors are often insufficiently 
aware of conflict situations. Conceptually, not 
enough attention is paid to this aspect; there are 
no real "conflict strategies" for the countries con-
cerned. This is a major deficiency not only in 
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countries particularly hard hit by conflicts (such 
as Rwanda) but also in countries where memories 
of conflict situations are fading (such as El Salva-
dor). 
Development cooperation can react to conflict 
situations in many different ways. However, the 
actors are often unaware of the options open to 
development cooperation for responding construc-
tively to conflict situations, and greater use should 
be made of them; this is particularly true of coun-
tries in the phases before a conflict becomes vio-
lent. 
In countries where there is a recognizable poten-
tial for conflict it should be taken into account in 
an adequate form in the country concept and 
country discussion (possibly specific "conflict-re-
lated country discussions"). 
In countries with clear conflict situations efforts to 
broach conflict-related problems during the policy 
dialogue should be stepped up. This is also true of 
the opportunities that German development coop-
eration has for bringing influence to bear on the 
multilateral policy dialogue. The conditions 
should be explicit and specific. 
Impact of German Development Coopera-
tion on Potential and Actual Conflict Situa-
tions 
It is methodologically difficult to analyse the im-
pact of German development cooperation on po-
tential and actual conflict situations. This is true 
both of the macro level – i.e. the influence of 
overall German development cooperation on a 
conflict – and of the level of individual projects 
and programmes (micro level). 
Impacts at Macro Level 
The six country studies come to different conclu-
sions as to the overall impact of German devel-
opment cooperation on potential and actual con-
flict situations. Three (Kenya, Mali and Sri Lanka) 
are, on the whole, rather positive. One (Rwanda) 
reaches a generally negative conclusion. Another 
(Ethiopia) is, by and large, ambivalent in its find-
ings, and yet another (El Salvador) concludes that, 
seen as a whole, no direct impact can be detected. 
German development cooperation had most influ-
ence in Kenya and northern Mali. 
All the studies identify opposing tendencies (am-
bivalences); in other words, examples can be 
found in each case of German development coop-
eration exacerbating the potential for conflict or 
conflict situations while also making positive con-
tributions. 
The most important possible positive impacts at 
macro level are: 
— the eventual removal of causes of conflict 
(regional disparities, employment opportuni-
ties, defusing of conflicts over natural re-
sources, etc.), 
— short- and medium-term political and social 
stabilization due to reconstruction measures, 
— political openness, participation, democratiza-
tion and an increase in the conflict awareness 
of societies and political systems, 
— achievement of security and improvement of 
human rights conditions through the presence 
of development cooperation personnel, 
— removal of opportunities for self-enrichment 
and of clientele systems through economic re-
form programmes / structural adjustment. 
The most important possible negative or problem-
atical impacts at macro level are: 
— direct support for and stabilization of gov-
ernments (through official development co-
operation) which are themselves involved in 
conflicts, 
— exacerbation of conflicts through encourage-
ment of clientele systems and opportunities 
for corruption, 
— wrong signals sent to the government and 
opposition forces through "omission" (e.g. 
failure to seize opportunities during the pol-
icy dialogue) and "approval", 
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— increased regional imbalances through the 
promotion of certain regions preferred by the 
governing elites, 
— violent countermeasures taken by the regime 
in response to pressure for political reform 
exerted by development cooperation (eventu-
ally, however, removal of potential for vio-
lence), 
— easing of the pressure on governments to take 
action to deal with the causes of conflict 
through development cooperation ("interna-
tionalization" of government tasks), 
— increase in the pressure to modernize 
(changes to economic structures and forms of 
social organization tend to cause conflicts), 
— increase in competitive behaviour in the pub-
lic sector due to economic reform pro-
grammes or structural adjustment. 
Some of these impacts may be conducive to con-
flict in the short or medium term, while in the 
long term they may be appropriate and lead to an 
easing of tension (e.g. pressure for political re-
form, economic reform programmes). 
Impacts at Micro Level 
1. Explicitly conflict-related measures 
Experience with explicitly conflict-related 
measures of official German development 
cooperation and of non-governmental devel-
opment cooperation reveals largely positive 
impacts on potential and actual conflict situa-
tions. 
Various rehabilitation and stabilization pack-
ages in Sri Lanka and above all the "Northern 
Mali Programme" made particularly positive 
contributions. The measures essentially 
helped to normalize the situation in various 
regions; a decline in law-breaking and arbi-
trary acts is associated with the programmes. 
In Mali it was also possible to take direct ac-
tion to reduce society's willingness to resort 
to conflict and violence and to help improve 
understanding between the warring parties. 
Various measures to demobilize and reinte-
grate combatants in Ethiopia and El Salvador 
similarly proved successful. They also had 
adverse effects, however, since they were 
perceived as an instrument of ethnic coloni-
zation (also Ethiopia), and programmes as-
sisted by other donors in Rwanda in this 
sphere were used to increase the efficiency of 
the military apparatus. 
Most of the NGOs' conflict-related measures 
were rated very highly. The sometimes vio-
lent reactions of regimes (especially in Kenya 
and Ethiopia) to NGOs' conflict-related ac-
tivities indicate that the latter were of some 
relevance and thus effective. Examples of 
positive impacts are: 
— Direct action taken by the Churches to re-
solve conflicts in areas of unrest had the 
effect of promoting peace in Kenya. It 
helped to make political processes more 
transparent and to improve the quality of 
political debate at national and local level 
and contributed to the debate on reforms. 
— In El Salvador the German Churches 
were able to provide considerable man-
power, ideological and material support 
for the peaceful settlement of the conflict. 
 The measures taken – particularly by the Po-
litical Foundations – to promote democracy 
and human rights cannot be equated per se 
with the de-escalation of crises, since they 
may sometimes help to bring a conflict to a 
head in the short to medium term if the re-
gime resorts to violent countermeasures. In 
the long term, however, they may prove very 
effective in removing potential for violence 
and causes of conflicts. 
 The work of the Churches and that of the Po-
litical Foundations differ in one important re-
spect: while the Churches usually have very 
good local interlocutors, the foundations de-
pend on identifying suitable counterparts, an 
approach which may cause problems (e.g. El 
Salvador). 
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2. Non-conflict-related measures 
Various development cooperation measures 
not geared to any specific conflict (such 
measures account for the bulk of German de-
velopment cooperation activities in the cases 
studied) are found to have a very wide vari-
ety of intended and, above all, unintended 
impacts. 
The positive impacts are primarily contribu-
tions to the long-term reduction of causes of 
conflicts or to the removal of factors that ex-
acerbate conflicts. Such contributions may, 
for example, take the form of projects and 
programmes concerning the protection of 
natural resources or the population policy 
sphere. Individual measures often have the 
further positive impact of contributing to the 
removal of clientelist structures, to the im-
provement of participation and to decentrali-
zation, although the real project objectives re-
late to "classical" areas of development pol-
icy (e.g. water supply). 
On the other hand, four unintended negative 
impacts of development cooperation projects 
and programmes were identified in the coun-
tries studied. First, there was found to be a 
danger of some decentralization measures 
helping the government to develop monitor-
ing structures and thus possibly repressive 
mechanisms. Second, development coopera-
tion measures may encourage self-enriching 
and corrupt clientelist structures at national, 
regional and local level. Third, some devel-
opment cooperation projects and programmes 
helped to increase disparities (e.g. among 
ethnic groups) by supporting, for example, 
infrastructure measures which were being 
implemented by the partner government and 
entailed the resettlement of certain ethnic 
groups. Fourth, there are indications of re-
source-related measures having unintended 
effects, where, for example, irrigation meas-
ures ease the pressure on land use, but also 
enable new settlers to move in, thus opening 
the way to fresh conflicts. Furthermore, the 
conditions may be such that other measures 
also have the effect of exacerbating conflicts. 
This was true, for instance, of a map financed 
as part of a GTZ project and showing a 
boundary line between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
that does not correspond to the internation-
ally recognized border. 
Impact of Individual Instruments 
The country studies enable a number of general 
statements to be made on various development 
cooperation instruments. The potential impact of 
policy dialogue and conditionality on conflict 
situations is particularly pronounced. Success 
largely depends on the leading donors' adoption of 
a coordinated approach, the avoidance of exces-
sive development cooperation ("over-aiding") and 
verifiable concrete demands and conditions. Both 
financial cooperation and technical cooperation 
have a number of specific features that may be 
relevant to conflicts. As partner governments are 
usually very interested in financial cooperation, 
linking it to policy dialogue or conditions can, in 
principle, be very effective. Technical coopera-
tion, on the other hand, is more controllable, 
which normally makes it possible to exercise 
greater influence on individual project and pro-
gramme components. It also has a stronger exter-
nal organizational structure (country offices). Fur-
thermore, the fungibility of development coopera-
tion may pose a problem for both financial and 
technical cooperation. In some cases non-
governmental organizations also offer conflict-
related measures, which are particularly important 
and out of the question for official development 
cooperation. Success does, however, very much 
depend on there being a suitable counterpart struc-
ture, which not all NGOs have. 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
In the past little account was taken of the impacts 
of German development cooperation with regard 
to conflicts. This is especially true of unintended 
negative impacts at both macro and project level. 
There were no criteria to enable relevance to con-
flicts to be identified quickly. 
An analysis of the impacts of German develop-
ment cooperation on potential and actual conflict 
situations produces a heterogeneous picture. A 
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very wide range of positive and negative effects 
can be identified at macro and project level. The 
links are complex. The impacts of German devel-
opment cooperation or even individual measures 
are often inconsistent. 
More deliberate use should be made of German 
development cooperation for strategic purposes in 
conflict situations, so that better account may be 
taken and a better assessment made of the general 
positive and negative impacts it has (assessment 
of political consequences). In development coop-
eration measures account should always be taken 
not only of technical aspects but also of factors of 
relevance to conflicts, since no project is in fact 
purely technical. 
The instruments of German development coopera-
tion should be used more purposefully against the 
background of a country's conflict situation. 
Where the government is involved in the conflict 
and pursues a repressive policy that exacerbates it, 
serious thought should be given to terminating 
development cooperation or changing the instru-
ments used. 
At the level of individual measures efforts should 
be made to analyse systematically positive and 
negative impacts relevant to conflicts (conflict im-
pact assessment) and to take account of the find-
ings at every stage of the planning, implementa-
tion and monitoring/evaluation. 
Special Features of Development Coopera-
tion in Conflict Situations 
Development cooperation in conflict situations 
has special features and requires a specific ap-
proach. The special features relate very largely to 
unstable and changing conditions and require-
ments in the countries concerned. 
To achieve effective conflict-related development 
cooperation, (1) a high degree of flexibility, (2) 
greater willingness to accept responsibility and to 
take risks, (3) modified procedures and (4) restric-
tions as regards the principles of sustainability and 
partnership are required. 
It is very important to have adequate donor coor-
dination at a general level (especially at donor 
meetings in Paris) and at the level of individual 
thematic "on-the-spot" donor groups and specific 
measures if the efforts of an individual donor are 
not to fall flat or to be foiled by other donors. 
Only if a sufficient number of relevant donors is 
prepared to take conflict-related action does de-
velopment cooperation have a chance to bring 
positive influence to bear on potential and actual 
conflict situations and to prevent adverse impacts 
from occurring. 
It is also necessary to consider whether under the 
prevailing conditions other policies support or 
possibly run counter to any conflict-related efforts 
forming part of German development cooperation. 
As a general rule foreign policy plays a coordinat-
ing role in this context. 
It should also be emphasized that the way in 
which German development cooperation is per-
ceived in the country affected by conflict is very 
important. In general, official development coop-
eration tends to give one warring party – the gov-
ernment – direct and indirect support. 
In view of the special circumstances facing devel-
opment cooperation in conflict situations the fol-
lowing points are important: (1) the procedures 
and instruments of German development coopera-
tion should be reviewed to see if they permit a 
sufficiently flexible and prompt reaction in con-
flict situations and, if necessary, they should be 
adjusted; (2) existing opportunities for coopera-
tion with non-governmental counterparts in the 
context of official development cooperation 
should be clarified; new forms of cooperation 
with actors in civil society may need to be de-
vised; (3) in conflict situations measures that per-
mit a broad and open approach (along the lines of 
"open funds", for example) are particularly suit-
able for meeting a wide range of requirements; (4) 
a greater willingness on the part of development 
cooperation actors to accept responsibility and 
take risks needs to be backed by politicians; (5) 
conceptually, general principles underlying devel-
opment policy (principles of sustainability and 
partnership/ownership) need to be adjusted when 
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conflicts occur; (6) German development coopera-
tion provides opportunities for foreign policy to 
play a more active role in some cases; (7) German 
development cooperation can never be neutral or 
purely technical in conflict situations; however, it 
should endeavour to appear impartial; cooperation 
with the government concerned should therefore 
be analysed when conflict situations occur. 
Other Conclusions and Recommendations 
The growing sensitivity of German development 
cooperation to conflict situations should find prac-
tical expression in two ways, over and above the 
conclusions and recommendations described 
above. 
First, the development cooperation actors in-
volved face new requirements when conflict situa-
tions occur. Their ability to cope with these re-
quirements appropriately depends on whether 
staff are adequately prepared for these tasks and 
whether their job specifications are appropriate. 
Suitable opportunities for training in "develop-
ment cooperation in conflict situations" should 
therefore be provided for the staff of the BMZ, the 
Foreign Office and the implementing agencies. 
Second, in view of the importance of "develop-
ment cooperation in conflict situations" as an area 
of responsibility greater organizational importance 
should be attached to it within the BMZ, and it 
should be established as a "cross-section task". If 
effective influence is to be brought to bear, par-
ticularly on the regional sections and implement-
ing agencies, a new organizational unit should be 
created as a specialized section. Other socio-
political areas should also be covered (especially 
"democracy" and "human rights"). 
 I Introduction 
Reason for the Study 
The early 1990s saw the beginning of an intensive 
international debate on the contribution that de-
velopment cooperation can make to stable and 
peaceful development in conflict and crisis situa-
tions. At international level this has been reflected 
particularly in the DAC Guidelines on Conflict, 
Peace and Development Co-operation,1 which 
were completed in 1997. In Germany the debate 
has led, inter alia, to the concept paper Entwick-
lungszusammenarbeit und Krisenvorbeugung (De-
velopment Cooperation and Crisis Prevention) 
drawn up by the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ).2 The new 
Minister and senior staff of the BMZ place par-
ticular emphasis on the major importance of the 
subject.3 
Some experience has been gained with projects 
geared to crisis prevention (e.g. demobilization 
measures, food aid). In certain countries a start 
has thus been made on including elements of cri-
sis prevention in projects and programmes. 
So far, however, there have been hardly any em-
pirical studies of the role that development coop-
eration as a whole has played, or might play, in 
specific conflict and crisis situations or of the re-
quirements that must be met if it is to make a suc-
cessful contribution to crisis prevention. 
The BMZ therefore commissioned an evaluation 
comprising six internal country studies (see be-
low). 
Given the importance of the terms "conflict" and 
"crisis" for this study, it should be said that con-
flicts are necessary components of societies and 
                                                     
1 See OECD (1997). 
2 See BMZ (1997). 
3 See, for example, the interviews with Federal Minister 
Wieczorek-Zeul and Parliamentary State Secretary 
Dr Eid in "Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit" (1999), 
Vol. 40, No. 1, pp. 8 ff. and 11 ff. respectively. 
essential elements of development; they should 
not therefore be prevented per se. The aim is 
rather to contribute to their peaceful and construc-
tive resolution or to help prevent them from being 
resolved by violent means. 
Objective of the Study4 
The objective of the evaluation entitled "Impact of 
development cooperation in conflict situations" is 
to study the role that German development coop-
eration has hitherto played in conflicts and crises. 
Both aspects which have prevented crises and as-
pects which have exacerbated crises will be con-
sidered in this context. Factors indicating that de-
velopment cooperation may well contribute to 
crisis prevention or conflict resolution will be 
identified. Above all, the interaction of the various 
instruments within the overall development coop-
eration framework must be assessed. 
The political and economic environment needed if 
development cooperation is to succeed will be 
explained, and the limits to its options defined. 
This study is the summary (cross-section) report 
on the evaluations, which were drawn up as inter-
nal working documents. 
The six internal country studies concern Ethiopia, 
El Salvador, Kenya, Mali, Sri Lanka and Rwanda. 
Various criteria were applied in the choice of the 
countries. Besides a degree of geographical distri-
bution (inclusion of experience gained in African, 
Asian and Latin American countries), the different 
phases of conflict5 played an important part in the 
selection. A further criterion was whether German 
development cooperation plays an appreciable 
role in the country concerned. 
                                                     
4 See the Terms of Reference reproduced in the annex. 
5 This report is guided by a scheme comprising a total of 
five roughly defined phases of conflict: (1) emergence, 
(2) escalation, (3) eruption, (4) de-escalation and (5) 
consolidation. The first two phases are often referred to 
as "pre-conflict", the last two as "post-conflict" phases. 
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— Kenya was chosen as an example of countries 
that have a clearly recognizable potential for 
conflict, although – despite various isolated 
violent events – it has not yet escalated into a 
full-blown conflict. 
— Sri Lanka was chosen as an example of coun-
tries currently affected by civil war. 
— Ethiopia, El Salvador, Mali and Rwanda 
were chosen as examples of countries in post-
war situations. The choice of countries illus-
trates the very different situations and the 
very wide variations in the continuing poten-
tial for conflict and violence. 
Rwanda differs significantly from the other "civil 
war countries" in various respects, there being 
little comparison between its genocide and the 
hostilities elsewhere. 
Three documents in particular were used as ana-
lytical foundations for the evaluations and the 
cross-section report: 
— the BMZ's concept paper Entwicklungszu-
sammenarbeit und Krisenvorbeugung (Devel-
opment Cooperation and Crisis Prevention), 6 
— the research project Krisenanalyse in der Ent-
wicklungszusammenarbeit (Crisis Analysis in 
Development Cooperation),7 which was 
commissioned by the BMZ and carried out by 
Angelika Spelten and contains, in particular, 
an indicator model for the tendency of socie-
ties to plunge into crisis, and 
— the DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and 
Development Co-operation.8 
The countries taken as examples were to be exam-
ined to see how far German development coopera-
tion instruments (bilateral development coopera-
tion projects and programmes in the context of 
financial cooperation, technical cooperation, pol-
icy dialogue and non-governmental cooperation) 
                                                     
6 See BMZ (1997). 
7 See Spelten (1998). 
8 See OECD (1997). 
have helped to reduce the potential for conflict or 
to influence social mechanisms that encourage the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts. An explicit study 
was also to be made of any cases of development 
cooperation (see Table 1) and its various instru-
ments unintentionally defusing or exacerbating 
conflicts, especially as "crisis prevention" as such 
has not hitherto been an avowed objective of 
German development cooperation. 
Although the general political context and the ac-
tivities of other donors (including multilateral in-
stitutions) and other actors were not to be investi-
gated, they were to be taken into account in the 
analysis. 
 
Table 1: Possible Impacts of Development Cooperation 
on Potential and Actual Conflict Situations 
Positive impacts / 
intentional 
 
Positive impacts / 
unintentional 
Negative impacts / 
unintentional 
Study Method 
This cross-section report uses the six evaluations 
as its main sources. 
Most of the information for the internal country 
studies was obtained from 
— country and project files held by the BMZ, 
German Agency for Technical Cooperation 
(GTZ) and Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau 
(KfW), 
— generally available publications (newspapers, 
academic reports, etc.), 
— interviews conducted in Germany with repre-
sentatives of the BMZ, the Federal Foreign 
Office, other governmental development co-
operation agencies, non-governmental organ-
izations (Churches, Political Foundations, 
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etc.) and relevant research institutes and ex-
perts,9 
— interviews conducted in the various coun-
tries10 with the embassies and development 
cooperation actors, 
— interviews with the warring parties and the 
government. 
Interviews and plausibility analyses were to be the 
tools for impact analysis. 
On this basis the evaluations were to be assessed 
to see whether and to what extent development 
cooperation as a whole and/or individual project 
activities had been able to help influence or defuse 
potential or actual conflict situations. 
The Mali evaluation is something of an exception. 
The experts were asked by BMZ to concentrate on 
the "Northern Mali Programme", while in the 
other evaluations an attempt was made to cover 
the whole spectrum of development cooperation 
in the countries concerned. 
To give the various studies ample opportunity to 
consider the specific situation adequately, the fo-
cus of attention in the evaluations varies ("general 
conditions", "conflict recognition and flow of in-
formation", etc.). 
For this cross-section report the following infor-
mation and working meetings as well as the actual 
evaluation reports were taken into account: 
— on 9 July 1998 a one-day meeting in prepara-
tion for the evaluations was held at the Ger-
man Development Institute (GDI) and was at-
tended by representatives of the BMZ (Sec-
                                                     
9 In some cases further discussions were held in Germany 
with other Federal and Land ministries, institutions and 
individuals. 
10 No provision was made for a visit in the case of the 
Rwanda study because the experts had already been to 
the country in the spring of 1998 for the BMZ evaluation 
entitled "German Development Cooperation with 
Rwanda" (see BMZ 1998). 
tions 04 and 310), most of the experts and 
two consultants; 
— on 19 January 1999 a one-day provisional 
appraisal meeting attended by representatives 
of the BMZ (Sections 04 and 310) and the 
Federal Foreign Office (Section 401) and by 
all the experts was held at the GDI; 
— in the latter half of February and early March 
199911 the various meetings were held at the 
BMZ to appraise the draft reports, representa-
tives of the appropriate working units of the 
BMZ, Foreign Office, GTZ and KfW as well 
as the experts being invited to attend; 
— on 2 June 1999 the draft of this cross-section 
report was discussed at the BMZ at a meeting 
attended by representatives of the various 
working units of the BMZ, Foreign Office 
(Section 401), GTZ and KfW. Account was 
also taken of the references added in writing 
by the BMZ and Foreign Office following the 
meeting of 2 June 1999. 
In addition, the evaluation entitled "German De-
velopment Cooperation with Rwanda"12, which 
was completed in 1998, was taken into account, 
since it is substantively linked to the Rwanda case 
study forming part of the evaluation of the "Im-
pact of development cooperation in conflict situa-
tions" and was undertaken by the same experts.13 
It should also be pointed out that this cross-section 
appraisal faced various specific methodological 
problems. They included the very "broad ap-
proach" adopted for the evaluation, which proved 
to be a challenge, particularly when it came to 
compiling the summary. What was examined was 
not a specific measure, a specific sector, a specific 
period, a specific region, a specific instrument or a 
specific implementing agency but a combination 
of all these dimensions. An added problem was 
                                                     
11 18 February 1999: El Salvador, 23 February 1999: Mali, 
24 February 1999: Ethiopia, 25 February 1999: Kenya,  
1 March 1999: Sri Lanka and 3 March 1999: Rwanda. 
12 See BMZ (1998). 
13 This approach was discussed at the Rwanda appraisal 
meeting on 3 March 1999. 
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that in many respects new methodological and 
substantive ground had to be broken. Thus, al-
though the "five development cooperation crite-
ria" and the "policy dialogue" and its impacts 
were to be covered by the research, they have yet 
to be analysed in specific studies. The breadth of 
the questions raised meant that the individual 
evaluations could not be expected to be strictly 
systematic or complete, given the very complex 
terms of reference. Nonetheless, it should be em-
phasized that the ambitious evaluation objective 
undoubtedly had many advantages and produced 
findings that could probably not have been 
achieved with a "narrow" and more "standard-
ized" approach. 
Study Period 
The draft cross-section report was completed by 
mid-April 1999. 
The draft evaluations were prepared in the period 
between the preparatory meeting on 9 July 1998 
and the overall appraisal meeting on 19 January 
1999. After the latter meeting and the individual 
appraisals the drafts were revised to take account 
of the conclusions drawn. 
The various evaluations covered different periods, 
which depended on the specific conditions pre-
vailing in the countries concerned: 
— Ethiopia: since 1991 (i.e. since the ousting of 
the Mengistu regime); 
— El Salvador: 1978 - 1998; 
— Kenya: 1991 - 1998 (i.e. since the initiation of 
the democratization process); 
— Mali: roughly 1991 - 1998 (i.e. since the be-
ginning of the preliminary deliberations on 
the Mali programme forming part of the 
German development cooperation consulta-
tions); 
— Rwanda: 1987 to early 1998; 
— Sri Lanka: 1995 - 1998 (i.e. since the begin-
ning of the third "Eelam war"). 
Other References 
The names of the countries covered by the six in-
ternal evaluations are set in italics (e.g. Rwanda) 
in the body of this report to make it easier to find 
references to these countries. 
Italics have otherwise been used for emphasis and 
for quotations. 
II Findings, Conclusions and Recom-
mendations Derived from the Evalua-
tions 
1 General Conditions for Development 
Cooperation in Conflict Situations 
Causes of and Potential for Conflict 
The causes of and potential for conflict in the 
countries studied differ in a number of respects. 
The conflicts can, however, be largely attributed – 
albeit with major differences – to (1) rivalry for 
resources and/or (2) the dominance of certain so-
cial groups. 
These causes are often exaggerated and distorted 
in the perception of warring parties. Perception of, 
say, how much discrimination an ethnic group 
suffers or how much preference it enjoys thus fre-
quently determines the behaviour of the actors 
concerned. In many cases ethnic or other apparent 
lines of conflict reflect political instrumentaliza-
tion. 
The countries studied reveal the following pat-
terns: 
— In Ethiopia the political system has proved to 
be the real cause of conflict since the collapse 
of the Mengistu regime. The former Tigré re-
sistance movement Ethiopian People's Revo-
lutionary Democratic Front/EPRDF has be-
come the dominant political force. Consider-
able potential for conflict has been created by 
the rigging of elections, the formulation of 
policy along ethnic lines (e.g. the creation of 
Impact of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations 5 
regions to reflect ethnolinguistic differences), 
widespread human rights violations, restric-
tion of the freedom of opinion and other fac-
tors. 
— In El Salvador unequal distribution in access 
to resources (especially in the agricultural 
sector) and the lack of opportunities for a 
large section of the population to participate 
in the political process can be identified as 
the main causes of the civil war. 
— Kenya's process of transition in the 1990s 
from a clientelist one-party state to a pluralist 
and democratic system has generated consid-
erable potential for conflict at national, re-
gional and local level. This was due to a 
strategy adopted by the regime to maintain 
power, in which it attempted to obstruct and 
slow down the process of transition with a 
view to averting the threat of losing political 
and economic influence. 
— The armed rebellion in the north of Mali was 
the expression and consequence of long-term 
political, economic and cultural neglect of the 
northern parts of the country. The conflict 
was exacerbated by the denial and political 
instrumentalization of the disparities by 
dominant sections of the "southern govern-
ment class", who were prepared to use force. 
Such other factors as the disastrous droughts 
of the 1970s and 1980s also played an impor-
tant part. 
— The causes of conflict that led to genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994 and perpetuate an unde-
clared state of war in certain parts of the 
country are the subject of heated debate in 
political and academic circles. The origins of 
the conflict are to be found in history (above 
all, the antagonism between Hutus and Tut-
sis), the specific background to the violence 
in the 1990s being of more recent origin. The 
elites want to retain power and sinecures, at a 
more general level there are demands from 
people displaced from their homes at various 
times (primarily for the right to return and for 
land), and at ideological level the interpreta-
tion of history varies. 
— In Sri Lanka the ethnic rivalry and above all 
the dominance of one group over the others 
has led to radicalization and so to civil war. 
This has resulted in the Sinhalese majority 
having firm, almost traditional ideas about 
being threatened, while the Tamil minority 
justifiably fears an irreversible loss of control 
over traditional areas of settlement and influ-
ence. 
For analysis and political action the simultaneous 
existence and overlapping of different types of 
potential for conflict is an important and difficult 
aspect. In Ethiopia, for example, the "political 
system" as a factor underlying conflict is joined 
by potential for conflict in the form of the military 
border dispute with Eritrea; there are also links 
between the two conflicts. In Sri Lanka there is 
considerable potential for conflict and violence in 
the form of marginalized, chauvinistically minded 
young Sinhalese, which has escalated in the past, 
but is usually overshadowed in the perception of 
the people by the bloody civil war. 
Whether factors assume the nature of "structural 
conflict factors" or act as "escalation factors" of-
ten cannot be determined, or not with any accu-
racy. Clear substantive and methodological classi-
fication is therefore problematical. 
Impact of Conflict Situations on Develop-
ment Policy 
Violent conflicts are very "costly", above all in 
humanitarian terms. Tremendous human suffering 
has been caused not only by the genocide in 
Rwanda but also by other conflict situations at 
various levels of escalation. 
Violent conflict situations are also very "costly" in 
development terms: 
— Serious conflicts in the form of civil wars, 
etc. are usually the main obstacle to the de-
velopment of a country or region (e.g. Sri 
Lanka). 
— Civil wars destroy social and economic infra-
structure; the cost of the physical damage to 
6 Stephan Klingebiel 
El Salvador's economy, for example, is esti-
mated at US $ 2 bn. 
— Conflicts absorb enormous financial re-
sources for military and security forces; the 
conflict in Sri Lanka accounts for about a 
quarter of all public funds. 
— Conflicts usually result in displacement and 
floods of refugees (e.g. Rwanda, El Salvador 
and Sri Lanka). 
— Conflicts traumatize individuals and groups, 
causing them to remain latent in societies for 
long periods and possibly hampering devel-
opment capacities (e.g. Mali and El Salva-
dor). 
— Conflict situations create unstable conditions 
for very long periods, often continuing long 
after peace has officially been declared (e.g. 
Mali and El Salvador). 
Settlement and De-escalation of Conflicts 
Few general patterns providing clues to the struc-
tures of conflict resolution and de-escalation can 
be identified. In case studies that note positive 
tendencies over long periods or for some time a 
widespread phenomenon of reversibility and fra-
gility can be detected: there is usually continuing 
uncertainty about steps that might lead or have 
already led to de-escalation and about wars that 
have ended. As a general rule, for the parties to a 
conflict to take a positive view there must be 
structures which they regard as a credible basis for 
a lasting and stable peace. 
The following factors are relevant to the de-
escalation or ending of some conflicts (Mali and 
El Salvador): (1) a no-win situation or acceptance 
by the warring factions that the war cannot be 
won by military means, (2) the high material cost 
of the war, (3) leading external actors do not exer-
cise any negative influence (e.g. they have no in-
terest in the continuation of the conflict) and (4) 
the efforts of national, regional and international 
actors to mediate. 
Experience in northern Mali shows, for example, 
that the laboriously achieved peace process is not 
irreversible, but still at risk. In El Salvador it has 
proved impossible to remove the structural causes 
of the conflict even though the peace process is 
under way. In fact, there are signs that the mani-
festations of the conflict have changed from po-
litically to socially visible violence. Of El Salva-
dor it can thus be said that the war may be over, 
but the violence continues. 
In Rwanda the situation is very unstable because 
the apparent stability is being imposed by repres-
sion. Genuine stability can therefore be achieved 
only when the confidence of the vast majority of 
the warring factions can be gained. 
The events in Sri Lanka in the mid-1990s show 
how a process of apparent conflict resolution may 
eventually prove to be a willingness to accept 
peace and negotiations for tactical reasons. 
External Influences on Conflicts and on the 
Conduct of German Policy 
What influence external actors have on conflict 
situations differs from one case to another and 
depends partly on the time and the regional envi-
ronment. Economic, political and military factors 
clearly play a major role as regards the importance 
that external actors attach to a country. 
Although the conflict situations studied for the 
evaluation were all "internal" conflicts or civil 
wars, they almost always had implications for 
neighbouring countries or links with their regional 
environment. The conflict situation in Rwanda, 
for example, must be seen in context with Bu-
rundi, Uganda, Tanzania and the former Zaire, the 
civil war situation in El Salvador must be viewed 
against the background of the developments in 
Nicaragua, Algeria and Libya tried to influence 
Mali's domestic policy, and the events in Sri 
Lanka are linked to India in several ways. 
Where non-regional actors play a part in conflicts, 
their actions are often determined, decisively in 
some cases, by spheres of influence (areas that 
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once belonged to colonial powers, etc.). German 
policy cannot act independently of such factors. In 
these situations it may forgo a political profile of 
its own (as in El Salvador, Mali and Rwanda) and 
avoid political actions that may not be approved 
by important partners (especially the USA, France 
and Britain). 
The basic attitude adopted in German develop-
ment cooperation towards various countries has 
been influenced and, in some cases, determined 
by geopolitical circumstances. In the final analy-
sis, this is also true of German development coop-
eration when, for example, it faces the question 
whether and to what extent a country should be 
assisted. 
The following can be given as examples of Ger-
man policy being essentially geared to what are 
perceived to be interests of important foreign 
partners: 
— Ethiopia: In the geostrategic thinking that 
underlies US security policy the country was 
seen (for a time at least) as a stabilizing factor 
on the Horn of Africa (and especially as a 
bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism). 
This perception has also had a major influ-
ence on Germany's attitude and policy. 
— El Salvador: The marked dominance of US 
interests and the considerable weight carried 
by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) limited the influence 
of other actors and thus of German develop-
ment cooperation. For the perception of the 
conflict in El Salvador the East-West conflict 
was of the utmost importance. 
— Mali: The German Foreign Office did not 
play a more active role in the official attempts 
at mediation out of consideration for France. 
— Rwanda: Care was taken to ensure that Ger-
man foreign policy on the whole Great Lakes 
region was consistent with French and US 
policy. 
The behaviour of external, non-regional actors 
was in some cases of crucial importance for the 
course taken by conflicts and their outcome. The 
USA's massive economic and military aid had a 
decisive influence on the civil war in El Salvador. 
Without US intervention in support of the gov-
ernment, the opposition might have had a real 
chance to take power. 
External actors' (non-military) attempts to de-
escalate hostilities or bring them to an end – such 
as attempts at mediation and diplomatic pressure – 
have varied in the impacts they have had. Many 
are likely to have been of secondary or subsidiary 
importance (as in the case of Mali and Sri Lanka). 
In El Salvador external efforts by the United Na-
tions, the USA, the European Community and 
others complemented the internal peace efforts. In 
certain cases – as in the pre-conflict situation in 
Kenya in the first half of the 1990s – external at-
tempts to bring influence to bear may, however, 
have been a decisive step towards de-escalation 
(through steps in the democratization process). 
2 Conflict Recognition and the Flow of 
Information 
The information and communication sphere is 
extremely important if development cooperation 
is to respond appropriately. Only if conflict rec-
ognition succeeds and the organizations involved 
are sufficiently well informed is it possible for 
development cooperation to be purposefully ad-
justed or generally reoriented to cope with a con-
flict situation. 
Where the various evaluations and also this cross-
section report are concerned, it must be empha-
sized that not only is the area of conflict recogni-
tion and the flow of information highly complex, 
but that the experts were not able to cover it fully. 
The reasons for this were that "information" and 
"communication" include many elements which 
cannot be fully analysed after the event. This is 
true, for example, of oral information (telephone 
conversations, discussions, etc.). Furthermore, not 
all the information that might have shed light on 
the subject could be appraised during the evalua-
tions. Although the experts had access to all the 
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documents held by the BMZ (including some 
drawn up by the Foreign Office, or the embassies, 
and, for example, the embassies' six-monthly re-
ports), the actual Foreign Office documentation 
was not available to them. Much the same was 
true of the reports which the Federal Intelligence 
Agency (BND) compiles and which form part of 
the Foreign Office and BMZ information system, 
but were not submitted to the experts. 
Despite the consequent limits to their informative 
value, the findings of the evaluations reveal some 
general experience from which conclusions and 
recommendations can be derived. 
2.1 Information on Conflict Situations, 
its Transmission and Interpretation 
When it is asked how well informed German de-
velopment cooperation actors are about conflict 
situations, it becomes apparent that a number of 
distinctions need to be made as regards the gather-
ing, transmission and evaluation of information. 
On the one hand, various levels are involved in 
conflict recognition: first, the individual project 
workers and projects, secondly, the embassies and 
local development cooperation offices (especially 
offices representing the GTZ) and thirdly, the 
headquarters in Germany in the shape of the For-
eign Office, the BMZ and the implementing agen-
cies. 
On the other hand, two direct principal informa-
tion chains can be identified in the case of the 
BMZ (the "strategic head" for development coop-
eration in conflict situations):14 one chain (related, 
as a general rule, to German technical cooperation 
because of its "on-the-spot" structures) stretches 
from the project through the GTZ office to GTZ 
headquarters and finally to the BMZ. The other 
consists of the German embassy (which also takes 
account of information obtained, for example, 
from German development cooperation projects) 
                                                     
14 Besides such indirect sources of information as newspa-
per reports. 
to the Foreign Office (which, in turn, takes ac-
count of information besides that contained in the 
embassies' reports) and the BMZ. 
 
Box 1: Levels of Information Gathering, Transmission 
and Evaluation in German Bilateral Develop-
ment Cooperation 
1. Project level: measures taken by the GTZ, the German 
Development Service/DED and other implementing 
agencies; also some information obtained from non-
governmental organizations 
2. Country coordination and representation level: Ger-
man embassy, GTZ office , DED representation, etc. 
3. Headquarters level in Germany: Foreign Office, GTZ, 
KfW, DED, etc. 
The evaluations have identified the following fea-
tures, phenomena or deficiencies common to them 
all or true of individual levels of the information 
system: 
Flow, Transmission and Evaluation of Informa-
tion 
The area of the flow, transmission and evaluation 
of information sometimes proved to be deficient 
and was highly problematical in some cases 
(Rwanda). In other cases the system was, all in all, 
workable, although there is room for improvement 
in various respects. 
The following shortcomings indicate that errors 
may occur in this area (some aspects of which will 
be discussed later): 
— Potential conflicts have been overlooked or 
underrated in the past (Ethiopia, El Salvador, 
Sri Lanka and Rwanda). 
— Embassies are selective in their recording of 
information. The knowledge of local groups 
(e.g. Churches) is not always adequately 
taken into account. In some cases embassies 
tended to reflect the position of the govern-
ment of the country concerned rather than 
adopting an attitude critical of the govern-
ment (Ethiopia, El Salvador, Kenya and 
Rwanda). 
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— In some cases the embassies' reporting tended 
towards optimistic assessments with respect 
to various conflict situations (Ethiopia, Kenya 
and Rwanda). 
— In many cases what is lacking is not informa-
tion but appropriate evaluation and appraisal. 
In various cases in the past interpretations of 
information relevant to conflicts have been 
eclipsed by foreign policy and party political 
considerations (El Salvador and Kenya). 
— Adequate collation of information by the em-
bassies is not always guaranteed (e.g. 
Rwanda). 
— The Foreign Office and BMZ are sometimes 
not well enough informed and therefore lack 
the basis that would enable them to react ap-
propriately (e.g. Rwanda). 
— Foreign Office information does not auto-
matically reach the BMZ. The information 
that tends to be forwarded is information that 
seems relevant to development, with the For-
eign Office deciding whether this is the case. 
— In the past most conflict situations have been 
of interest to development cooperation only 
in a very strict technical sense and have often 
been ignored. Conflicts have frequently been 
perceived in development cooperation as 
"disruptive elements" over which little influ-
ence can be exercised and which should, 
where possible, be excluded from develop-
ment cooperation activities. They have usu-
ally attracted more interest if they affected the 
technical implementation of a project (safety 
of the project staff, etc.). 
— Information on the GTZ information chain 
(project – GTZ – BMZ) rarely focuses on 
conflicts. 
— At project level there is often very good and 
detailed knowledge of a conflict situation and 
the practical conditions in a region. However, 
there is often a failure to relate this knowl-
edge to a conflict situation affecting a whole 
society; it is not systematically recorded or 
passed on. 
— The BMZ does not yet have an organizational 
structure that guarantees the proper gathering 
and evaluation of information relevant to con-
flicts. 
Other features or positive tendencies are: 
— In many cases information problems cannot 
be identified in conflict recognition at the 
level of the embassy and of the Foreign Of-
fice or BMZ, and the recording and transmis-
sion of information therefore pass off 
smoothly (El Salvador, Kenya, Mali and Sri 
Lanka). 
— The end of the East-West conflict has resulted 
in an appreciable improvement in conflict 
recognition. Information is recorded and 
evaluated with a far less pronounced ideo-
logical or foreign policy bias (thinking in 
terms of eastern and western "camps") (e.g. 
Kenya). 
— Some German non-governmental organiza-
tions are very well informed. This may be due 
to close links with local partner institutions 
(e.g. Ethiopia, El Salvador and Rwanda). 
Country-related Experience 
In Ethiopia's case the country study emphasizes a 
tendency in Foreign Office documents to play 
down the undemocratic and authoritarian nature of 
the EPRDF regime. 
In El Salvador's case German development coop-
eration has clearly been eclipsed by foreign policy 
and party political interests, especially during the 
civil war. The German debate on El Salvador at 
that time was closely linked to the debates on 
events in Nicaragua, making it difficult to identify 
specific Salvadoran features and to react appro-
priately. In these circumstances German develop-
ment cooperation did not accord with the princi-
ples of development policy. 
In Kenya's case a significant increase in the sensi-
tivity of the German actors can be identified in 
conflict recognition and conflict awareness since 
the early 1990s. Although conflicts are recognized 
at project level, project staff are very reluctant to 
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raise the matter with superior authorities. They 
have a tendency to want to keep the political di-
mension out of projects or to cope with conflicts 
themselves. 
The level and flow of information have been satis-
factory in Mali's case. There has been a high den-
sity of information and a lively exchange of in-
formation between the German embassy, the For-
eign Office, the BMZ, the GTZ and the KfW. 
Conflict recognition and the flow of information 
have proved to be particularly difficult in 
Rwanda's case. The situation even before the 
genocide in Rwanda should have resulted in clear 
warnings of what was to come. All the major in-
formation chains, or the "headquarters" level, and 
the German embassy as the link proved to be the 
main weaknesses in Rwanda. The "headquarters" 
level (especially the Foreign Office and BMZ) 
was surprised by the genocide, although appropri-
ate information was available. The German em-
bassy had information that should have led to an 
in-depth assessment and so to different reports. 
There was, moreover, a wealth of information at 
the level of the projects and German staff in vari-
ous of the country's institutions, although it did 
not result in an improvement in the embassy's 
knowledge or in the embassy changing its reports. 
The German actors are well enough informed 
about the civil war in Sri Lanka. They also antici-
pate other, conceivable potential for conflict be-
sides the dominant conflict. In the past, however, 
not enough account was taken of the particularly 
relevant potential for ethnopolitical conflict in the 
assistance provided for two dam construction pro-
jects of considerable importance to the country. 
These measures were evaluated as subprojects, 
but an evaluation of the programme as a whole 
was not undertaken. 
2.2 Crisis Indicators ("Spelten 
Criteria") 
The evaluations give a predominantly positive 
answer to the question whether crisis indicators as 
defined in the BMZ research project15 are in prin-
ciple suitable for the recognition of any tendency 
of societies towards crisis. 
In the ex post view they take various country stud-
ies (e.g. those on Ethiopia, Kenya and Sri Lanka) 
in the overall evaluation assume that the proposed 
crisis indicators would have improved conflict 
recognition. An appropriate crisis analysis might 
therefore have produced a complete check list and 
led to a more realistic assessment of potential and 
actual conflict situations. 
Two qualifications are, however, important as re-
gards informative value and possible supporting 
impacts in decision-making. Firstly, the indicator 
model has an inherent tendency to be "hyper-
anticipatory". As it is inclined to identify a wide 
range of potential conflicts, its usefulness might 
be reduced. Secondly, the list of indicators pre-
supposes that it is completed and used without 
bias and objectively. In past situations where de-
velopment cooperation actors have taken a highly 
ideological view (e.g. El Salvador), such an ap-
proach would probably have yielded little addi-
tional information. 
2.3 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions 
All in all, conflict recognition and the flow of in-
formation in German development cooperation 
have proved problematical in some respects in the 
past. The following may provide an explanation 
for some of the major structural shortcomings and 
phenomena: 
                                                     
15  See Spelten (1998). 
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"Cognitive Dissonance" 
Conflict situations usually feature human rights 
violations, political murders or even genocide. 
They are therefore associated with strong emo-
tions, even for outside observers. This often leads 
to marked polarization. The studies on El Salva-
dor, Rwanda and Ethiopia document such tenden-
cies, although the circumstances and manifesta-
tions differ widely. In El Salvador's case, for ex-
ample, there was no shortage of information, but a 
perception of the civil war that was ideologically 
biased. In Rwanda's case the information system 
(recording, transmission and processing) proved 
to be altogether highly problematical. 
To some extent at least, these tendencies are due 
to the phenomenon of "cognitive dissonance", 
which was described in the Rwanda study. This 
indicates that the information system, on which 
decisions taken by German development coopera-
tion actors are based, receives a wide range of 
highly disparate and, above all, contradictory in-
formation, which gives rise to inconsistencies: 
actors receive information (of political murders, 
human rights violations, etc.) that may not accord 
with their own experience or convictions. Such 
inconsistencies may be handled in various ways: 
no notice is taken of information that does not 
appear to fit (selective perception), or certain ref-
erences are rated differently according to past ex-
perience. In general, there is thus a tendency not 
to allow inconsistent information to "disturb" an 
existing picture (of a conflict situation, for exam-
ple). 
Reluctance to Refer to Conflict Situations 
The staff of some development cooperation pro-
jects, the GTZ country offices and headquarters 
and embassies tend to be reluctant to refer to con-
flicts. There are many reasons for this. 
At project level there may be some fear that any 
problems arising in this context will be ascribed to 
the staff's incompetence. The transmission of such 
information might also result in a project being 
questioned or completely abandoned because of 
the security situation. This would have direct pro-
fessional implications for the project staff. 
Similar factors may play a part at the level of the 
GTZ country offices and headquarters;16 referring 
to conflict situations might trigger an unforesee-
able chain of reactions, all the more so as German 
development cooperation is taking increasing ac-
count of political dimensions (in the form, say, of 
the "five development cooperation criteria"). Indi-
vidual measures or the whole programme in a 
country might therefore be jeopardized. Given the 
division of responsibilities, it can be assumed that 
implementing agencies have a business interest in 
the continuation of their respective country activi-
ties, which cannot be said of the BMZ. 
It is likely to be equally difficult to assess the re-
action to an "offensive" embassy report that is 
critical of the government concerned. In cases 
where the situation is not clear reports of persis-
tent or growing signs of conflict (such as human 
rights violations) might result in the Foreign Of-
fice coming under pressure to act, which would 
eventually be reflected in certain instructions be-
ing given to the embassy (to raise the subject with 
the partner country's foreign ministry, etc.). This 
may explain why reporting tends to be restrained 
in certain situations (e.g. when not all observers 
rate the potential for conflict equally high). 
Attempts to "Shield" Projects from Conflicts 
There is a tendency in development cooperation 
measures to devise mechanisms that shield project 
activities from a hostile environment rather than 
taking direct and appropriate account of conflict 
situations. As far as possible, the team's "own" 
project is not to suffer because of the unfavour-
able environment, let alone come under threat. 
The project team may therefore have a major in-
terest in ensuring technical implementation and in 
ignoring the conflict and the political dimensions. 
                                                     
16 This problem may also affect other implementing agen-
cies, especially the KfW. Little account of this was, 
however, taken in the evaluations, however, not least be-
cause the GTZ has a comparatively strong external struc-
ture. 
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Failure to Place Development Cooperation Meas-
ures in Context 
Some development cooperation measures tend to 
recognize conflict situations at national or re-
gional level, but not to associate them with events 
at local level. Conflicts relating to a specific pro-
ject may not therefore be seen in the context of the 
country's general conflict situation. Problems are 
ascribed to the specific conditions prevailing in 
the project environment (personal circumstances, 
etc.). 
Recommendations 
In general, efforts should be made to improve the 
capacity for conflict recognition and the flow of 
information between the various levels. Such ef-
forts should cover the following: 
⇒ The flow of information between the Foreign 
Office and the BMZ should be reviewed with 
the aim of giving both a coordinated and 
comprehensive picture of conflict situations 
in partner countries. 
⇒ The flow of information from the projects, 
the development cooperation country offices 
and the embassies to the BMZ is very impor-
tant. Suitable means (e.g. better opportunities 
for travel on mission) of improving the direct 
flow of information should be sought. 
⇒ The project level should be encouraged to 
refer to actual and potential conflicts and to 
report on them. The same is true of the GTZ's 
country offices and its headquarters, the aim 
being to ensure the forwarding of relevant po-
litical information to the BMZ and Foreign 
Office. The current reporting channels should 
be reviewed to identify any need for the in-
clusion of appropriate categories to take more 
purposeful account of the general environ-
ment. 
⇒ Embassies in countries affected by conflict 
should consider whether all relevant local 
sources and groupings (Churches, etc.) are 
adequately involved in information gathering. 
⇒ Training opportunities should be created for 
the staff of the BMZ, the Foreign Office and 
the implementing agencies with a view to 
achieving a higher degree of sensitivity to 
conflicts.17 
⇒ Any tendency for countries to be overtaken 
by crisis should be more consciously and sys-
tematically recorded by the BMZ. The indica-
tor model commissioned by the BMZ ("Spel-
ten criteria") is therefore an appropriate and 
important step, which should be put into prac-
tice.18 
⇒ To improve conflict recognition and the deci-
sion-making processes in conflict situations, 
the BMZ's current organizational structures 
should be reconsidered. A specific BMZ 
working unit should be set up for this area of 
responsibility.19 
3 Relationship between German Devel-
opment Cooperation and Conflict 
Situations 
3.1 Planning, Conception and Im-
plementation 
Development Cooperation Strategies 
German development cooperation pursued very 
different strategies in the countries studied. In 
very general terms two patterns of behaviour can 
be distinguished: 
On the one hand, there are countries or periods in 
which official German development cooperation 
as a whole attempted to disregard an actual or po-
tential conflict. No specific efforts were made to 
prevent or resolve conflicts. This behaviour is 
guided by the status quo. Such a strategy of reac-
                                                     
17 See also section 2.6. 
18 The "political risk analysis" proposed by one evaluation 
(Ethiopia) is very similar to the crisis indicator model. 
19 See also section 2.6. 
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tive conflict-induced adjustment may result in cer-
tain changes being made (withdrawal of develop-
ment cooperation personnel because of the secu-
rity situation, measures no longer possible in cer-
tain parts of the country because of a civil war, 
etc.) at least in countries where violent disputes 
have become fairly widespread. These actions 
tend, however, to be a forced reaction to a change 
in circumstances and rarely, if ever, a reaction to 
an explicitly conflict-related situation. 
On the other hand, it is possible to identify coun-
tries or phases in which German development co-
operation has made a conscious effort to contrib-
ute to crisis prevention or conflict resolution. Such 
a strategy of explicit sensitivity to conflict may 
manifest itself in different ways. It includes vari-
ous of the following elements: 
— A concept or strategy for crisis prevention or 
conflict resolution is devised (as part of the 
BMZ's country concept, for example). 
— The issues are addressed in the form of policy 
dialogue at bilateral and international level 
(with particular account taken of the BMZ's 
"five development cooperation criteria"). 
— The development cooperation volume or de-
velopment cooperation as a whole is made 
conditional on certain changes of behaviour 
related to the conflict situation (condition-
ality). 
— Conditions relevant to the conflict are laid 
down at the level of individual development 
cooperation measures or specific sectors (pro-
ject-related or sectoral conditionality). 
— Current or new development cooperation 
measures in traditional development spheres 
are examined for their relevance to conflicts 
and, if necessary, rearranged (e.g. the ethnic 
composition of the target group). 
— Specific crisis prevention or conflict resolu-
tion measures are planned and implemented. 
— Cooperation with non-governmental organi-
zations and the promotion of non-govern-
mental activities are examined specifically for 
their relevance to conflicts and, where appro-
priate, stepped up. 
In most of the countries studied "mixed conflict 
strategies" containing elements of reactive con-
flict-related adjustments and revealing explicit 
sensitivity to conflict had clearly been adopted in 
German development cooperation. Such strategies 
are, however, largely the outcome of an evolving 
process and less the expression of explicit strate-
gic planning (of the country concepts, for exam-
ple). 
Conceptual deliberations on the conflict situation 
occurred in some instances, but did not lead to 
action being taken, or not in a form that was 
clearly visible. This is true, for example, of the 
1993 country concept for Kenya, in which a strat-
egy was devised for fostering the stagnant democ-
ratization process and thus for preventing crises, 
and of the GTZ's 1996 concept "Crisis prevention 
with emergency relief and development coopera-
tion resources in Rwanda"; neither concept, how-
ever, has had any major influence on the actual 
approach to development cooperation. 
 
Box 2: Four Options for Influencing a Conflict Situa-
tion from Outside during the Emergence and 
Escalation Phases: the Case of Kenya 
For development cooperation with Kenya in the 1990s 
there were, in principle, four options (Germany and most 
other donors implicitly chose the third): 
1. Maintenance of the status quo: Stabilization of the 
regime through external support, especially from de-
velopment cooperation with no conditions attached. 
2. Significant reduction in commitment to development: 
A regime dependent on development cooperation is 
confronted with economic and political difficulties. As 
this increases the pressure on the regime, which will 
resort to anything in its fight for survival, the potential 
for violence may grow substantially. 
3. Active promotion of the transition process: Through 
the attachment of conditions to bi- and multilateral fi-
nancial cooperation pressure is exerted on the regime 
to undertake democratic reforms. In the short and me-
dium term the danger with this strategy is that the gov-
ernment circles benefiting from the status quo will de-
velop strategies to preclude or at least reduce the loss 
of power they fear. 
4. Active promotion of crisis prevention: The donors 
press for the implementation of political reforms. They 
devise a strategy for improving skills and capacities 
for the peaceful settlement of conflicts and reducing 
the potential for violence. The strategy also includes 
conditionality in bi- and multilateral cooperation. 
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In most of the countries studied there was an im-
plicit need for various adjustments to the country 
strategies (Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Sri Lanka). 
Some efforts geared specifically to the conflict 
situation were also made. They largely concerned 
certain periods or individual elements rather than 
longer-term and comprehensive conflict-related 
country strategies or a genuine concentration of 
effort. Thus explicit crisis-related measures were 
promoted (temporarily in some cases) in Ethiopia, 
El Salvador, northern Mali and Sri Lanka (see 
below). In El Salvador it can be seen that after a 
brief period the planning reverted to normal de-
velopment cooperation thinking, and sensitivity to 
the conflict waned. In Kenya political pressure 
(conditionality) was exerted, but it was not backed 
by conflict-related measures of official German 
development cooperation. In Sri Lanka a number 
of explicit development cooperation projects were 
launched without any desire to focus on the con-
flict. The German development cooperation pro-
ject in northern Mali was explicitly geared to the 
stabilization of the region from the outset. In 
Rwanda the conflict situation (civil war and geno-
cide) did not on the whole result in any rear-
rangement of development cooperation; the same 
is true of the formulation of the country concept. 
Reactive Conflict-induced Adjustments 
In the cases studied reactive conflict-induced ad-
justments were made both to the overall orienta-
tion or large areas of development cooperation 
and at the level of individual projects and pro-
grammes. 
The following examples can be given of the con-
flict-induced adjustment of development coopera-
tion as a whole: 
— An acute conflict situation prevents certain 
areas from being reached by official devel-
opment cooperation (El Salvador, Sri Lanka 
and Rwanda). 
— The question of certain groups (ethnic groups, 
elites, etc.) being relatively privileged by de-
velopment cooperation is of general or at 
least latent significance (e.g. Rwanda and Sri 
Lanka). 
— A conflict situation causes German develop-
ment cooperation to be reoriented towards 
emergency relief and aid to refugees (e.g. 
Ethiopia). 
— The escalation of a conflict situation and the 
resulting implications at local level may in-
crease the need for greater sectoral and pro-
ject conditionality (e.g. Kenya). 
— Some German development cooperation staff 
are withdrawn or all are withdrawn for a time 
(e.g. El Salvador and Sri Lanka). 
— Conflict situations increase the need for more 
rapid changes to development cooperation 
planning and strategies. This may be reflected 
in (temporarily) shortened cycles for govern-
ment negotiations or commitments (e.g. 
Kenya and Sri Lanka). 
— A conflict situation causes a conscious or un-
conscious division of labour with non-
governmental development cooperation ac-
tors in politically sensitive spheres (e.g. El 
Salvador and Rwanda). 
The following examples, some of which corre-
spond to those given above, can be cited as con-
flict-induced adjustments at project level: 
— a quota system at a teacher training institute 
in Sri Lanka in favour of an ethnic group suf-
fering from discrimination; 
— conditions attached to German development 
cooperation in Kenya in connection with a 
water supply project with the aim of develop-
ing water works operating on a commercial 
basis and applying tariffs that cover their 
costs, thus circumventing centralist structures 
and clientele systems; 
— planning and implementation of emergency 
aid and refugee measures in Ethiopia and 
Rwanda. 
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Box 3: Ignoring Conflict Situations at Project Level: 
an Example from El Salvador 
The "Atiocoyo Rural Services" project was meant to sup-
port approaches to agricultural reform through the im-
provement of services (irrigation, marketing, etc.), starting 
in 1976. The objective was to increase the incomes of 
small and medium-sized farms. The project thus had a 
clear substantive link with the causes of the conflict. 
After the project had been attacked several times (material 
damage being done and, in some cases, project-related 
demands being voiced), the German experts were with-
drawn in December 1979. Despite the general "freezing" 
of German development cooperation, the project was con-
tinued by two local workers. The German presence was at 
least to be sustained at a low level for foreign policy rea-
sons in order to maintain the traditionally good relations 
with the government. 
The civil war was reflected in the planning and project 
documents in the ensuing years only to the extent that it 
affected the security of the project staff. Impacts that the 
project might have on the conflict were not singled out for 
comment, the same being true of the demands voiced in 
connection with the attacks on the project. It was not until 
the main progress review report in December 1989 that 
reference was made to the problem caused by the project 
planning ignoring the fact that the project was located in 
the middle of the conflict zone. 
Official Development Cooperation Meas-
ures Related Explicitly to Conflicts 
Official German development cooperation meas-
ures related explicitly to conflicts – albeit isolated 
measures in some cases – were planned and im-
plemented in Ethiopia, El Salvador, Mali, Rwan-
da and Sri Lanka. The approach adopted in these 
countries, however, was not, or no more than su-
perficially, based on a country-related conflict 
strategy. No explicitly conflict- related measures 
were taken in Kenya within the framework of of-
ficial German development cooperation. A par-
ticularly strong commitment by non-governmental 
organizations in this area can be seen in some 
countries (Ethiopia, El Salvador, Kenya, Sri Lan-
ka) (see below). 
Explicitly conflict-related development coopera-
tion measures are geared directly to exercising 
influence relevant to a conflict. This specific ori-
entation can take different forms. The six country 
studies enable the following to be classified as 
official German development cooperation meas-
ures related explicitly to conflicts:20 
— measures to demobilize and reintegrate sol-
diers (including promotion of employment 
opportunities and housing construction) in 
Ethiopia, El Salvador and Sri Lanka,21 
— rehabilitation and integration of war victims 
(orthopaedic project) in El Salvador, 
— reconstruction of war-damaged facilities and 
rehabilitation in Sri Lanka, 
— comprehensive programmes in Mali and Sri 
Lanka for social, political and economic sta-
bilization (reintegration aid for returnees, in-
come-generating measures, reconstruction of 
damaged infrastructure, etc.), 
— project for strengthening the judiciary (espe-
cially against the background of the pending 
genocide trials in Rwanda), 
— psychological counselling for children and 
young people in conflict situations (planned, 
but not yet operational), 
— democratization assistance provided by the 
Foreign Office in Ethiopia. 
Non-governmental Development Coopera-
tion Measures Related Explicitly to Con-
flicts 
German non-governmental organizations have 
made specific efforts to influence conflict situa-
tions in various countries (Ethiopia, El Salvador, 
Kenya, Sri Lanka). A particularly visible com-
mitment in conflict-related areas has been shown 
by the Political Foundations and the Churches 
(including their relief agencies); in some cases 
other NGOs (non-governmental organizations) too 
have been active (an example being Deutsche 
Welthungerhilfe/German Agro Action in Sri 
Lanka). 
                                                     
20 Some of these are prospective or planned measures. 
21 In Sri Lanka's case German development cooperation 
actors have offered help of this kind if peaceful condi-
tions prevail. 
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This is also partly true of countries where German 
bilateral development cooperation is not promot-
ing any explicitly conflict-related measures (e.g. 
Kenya); in El Salvador there has at times been a 
conscious or unconscious division of labour: 
while official development cooperation has tended 
to be confined to "neutral" areas, the Political 
Foundations and Churches have addressed politi-
cal problems. In Sri Lanka's case certain NGOs 
may also become active in areas to which official 
development cooperation does not have access. 
These are "uncleared areas" controlled by the 
LTTE. NGOs have also been active at times when 
official German development cooperation has 
been "frozen" (e.g. El Salvador). In some cases, 
NGOs (and particularly the Political Foundations) 
have assisted measures aimed at promoting de-
mocracy and protecting human rights without de-
liberately seeking to contribute to crisis preven-
tion. 
 
Table 2: Conflict-related Measures Undertaken by 
Non-governmental Organizations (Examples) 
– Reconciliation projects (psychosocial trauma counsel-
ling, information programmes on human and civil 
rights, etc.) and peace committees formed at the local 
and regional level by the Churches in Kenya, 
– Misereor's support for the Justice and Peace Commis-
sion in Sri Lanka, 
– advice on a constitution provided by the Friedrich 
Ebert Foundation in Ethiopia, 
– support from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and 
Brot für die Welt for such critical magazines with links 
to the Church as Dialogue, Kinyamateka and Imbaga 
in Rwanda, 
– seminars, workshops and meetings organized by the 
Heinrich Böll Foundation in Kenya for the discussion 
of "conflict management in ethnic conflicts", 
– cooperation between the Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
and the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies in Co-
lombo, Sri Lanka, 
– meeting of Oromo exile groups (Ethiopia) in Germany 
organized by the Heinrich Böll Foundation,  
– measures relating to democracy and human rights 
taken by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the Friedrich 
Naumann Foundation and the Hanns Seidel Founda-
tion in Kenya. 
In most cases NGOs have been active in areas not 
covered by German bilateral development coop-
eration. Objectives relating to crisis prevention 
and conflict resolution are often reflected in the 
titles of the measures. While the Political Founda-
tions concern themselves with general social is-
sues and target groups (such as fora for dialogue 
between the government and opposition groups in 
Ethiopia), the Churches in particular undertake 
specific conflict-related measures at local level 
(e.g. the formation of peace committees in 
Kenya). Churches also exert political pressure at 
national level, as with their pastoral letters in 
Kenya. 
3.2 Five Development Cooperation 
Criteria22 
Some of the evaluations contain explicit state-
ments on the five development cooperation crite-
ria. Two assume that the criteria have been of lit-
tle relevance or have not been applied, claiming 
that: 
— in Ethiopia's case at least three of the five 
criteria were not being observed (viz. respect 
for human rights, the rule of law and a guar-
antee of legal certainty, and the participation 
of the people in political decision-making); 
on the other hand, priority had been given to 
the criterion of "orientation of government 
action towards development", but even this 
criterion has been eclipsed by interests relat-
ing to the country's political stability and geo-
strategic position; 
                                                     
22 The five development cooperation criteria formulated by 
the BMZ in the early 1990s are: (1) respect for human 
rights, (2) participation of the people in political deci-
sion-making, (3) the rule of law and a guarantee of legal 
certainty, (4) the creation of a market-economy and so-
cially oriented economic order and (5) the orientation of 
government action towards development. 
 The findings of the evaluations covered by this paper are 
comparable only to a degree in this respect. Some of the 
country studies discuss how far the evaluator believes 
the development policy criteria to have been satisfied 
and whether action should have been taken on this basis. 
One evaluation, however, considers whether the five cri-
teria take sufficient account of conflict dimensions in 
their practical application. 
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— in Rwanda's case (after the genocide) three or 
even four of the development policy criteria 
had not been entirely satisfied, and no posi-
tive tendencies were identifiable (viz. respect 
for human rights, the rule of law and a guar-
antee of legal certainty, the participation of 
the people in political decision-making and 
the orientation of government action towards 
development); in these circumstances, devel-
opment cooperation ought to have been 
stopped or severely curtailed on several occa-
sions; 
— the BMZ appraisals of Sri Lanka's policy in 
the context of the five development coopera-
tion criteria revealed various links between 
the conflict situation and what the list of cri-
teria covers (e.g. the human rights situation). 
The actual civil war, on the other hand, is not 
automatically or specifically covered by the 
structure of the five criteria; however, the 
category "orientation of government action 
towards development" is to some extent at 
least suitable for taking account of this di-
mension. Explicit provision is not made for a 
category that specifically covers the "the gov-
ernment's (or other warring factions') desire 
for peace", but the BMZ's appraisals of Sri 
Lanka have covered this aspect under the 
heading "Special features". 
3.3 Policy Dialogue and Conditionality 
In the context of a policy dialogue an approach at 
both bilateral and multilateral level is possible. At 
bilateral level it is primarily government negotia-
tions as well as government consultations and the 
embassies' permanent dialogue with government 
agencies that provide a regular opportunity for 
concern to be expressed. Visits by leading Ger-
man figures (ministerial and senior levels of the 
FO and BMZ, delegations from the German Bun-
destag, etc.) to partner countries or by leading fig-
ures in the partner country to Germany may also 
provide an opportunity for issues relevant to 
conflicts to be addressed. Opportunities for con-
ducting a multilateral policy dialogue also arise at 
the Consultative Group Meetings organized by the 
World Bank and in such international fora as the 
European Union and the United Nations. 
In some cases at least advantage has been taken of 
bilateral relations to conduct with the partner 
country's government a policy dialogue in which 
issues relevant to a conflict have deliberately been 
raised. This is true of Ethiopia (1993 and 1996), 
Kenya since the early 1990s, Sri Lanka and 
Rwanda since the genocide. However, the ten-
dency in various cases has been to voice criticism 
in general terms during the policy dialogue and 
not to formulate any explicit conditions (Sri 
Lanka and Rwanda, for example). 
The policy dialogue with most conditions attached 
has been conducted with Kenya, and it very obvi-
ously had an effect on the eventual volume of de-
velopment cooperation. The donor community has 
put enormous pressure on the government. Ger-
many has played a major role at bilateral level and 
also, being one of the leading donors, at interna-
tional level in seeing to it that a common interna-
tional position was adopted. It reacted to the Ken-
yan government's stop-go reform process in a 
graded form: the German government responded, 
for example, by cancelling government negotia-
tions, by making commitments to current projects 
for only one year, by withdrawing new commit-
ments in the area of financial cooperation and by 
not disbursing financial cooperation funds. 
For various countries and periods, however, it can 
also be shown that opportunities for policy dia-
logue were not, or not adequately, seized. This 
was true at times of El Salvador under the Duarte 
government, when no conditions relevant to the 
conflict were formulated. Whether or not the gov-
ernment satisfied development policy criteria was 
not seen as a problem. On the other hand, the 
German government froze official development 
cooperation resources intended for El Salvador at 
a later time (1989), referring explicitly to serious 
human rights violations as the reason for its ac-
tion. 
At only one time (1997) did those responsible for 
German development cooperation criticize the 
conduct of government in Ethiopia, and they have 
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been sparing in their criticism of this aspect in 
Rwanda. 
Sri Lanka's government saw the policy dialogue 
as an opportunity to discuss conflict-related prob-
lems with the German government. Its main inter-
est in this has been to draw attention to the 
LTTE's use of compatriots living abroad to protect 
much of its financial base. 
During the international policy dialogue efforts 
were made to influence Kenya and Sri Lanka. 
They have been particularly obvious in Kenya's 
case since 1991: at the Consultative Group Meet-
ing in November 1991 the leading donors decided 
to suspend budgetary aid until the promised eco-
nomic reforms were undertaken, the one-party 
system was abolished and corruption was signifi-
cantly reduced. The donors subsequently exerted 
pressure on several occasions as soon as there 
were signs of the process of democratization be-
ginning to flag. They also used an informal "on-
the-spot" donor group known as the Democratic 
Development Group to conduct a dialogue with 
the government and also to exert political pressure 
(press statements, memoranda and personal letters 
to President Moi). In Sri Lanka's case issues con-
nected with the conflict situation were raised at 
Paris donor meetings (1996 and 1998) by the 
German delegation and others (call for direct, un-
conditional discussions between the warring fac-
tions, human rights situation, etc.). 
3.4 Country-related Experience and 
Focal Issues 
Although German development cooperation with 
Ethiopia was crisis-related in the late 1970s and 
during the 1980s in view of the civil war and its 
consequences, it was hardly used for the purposes 
of crisis prevention and conflict resolution. After 
the Mengistu regime had been toppled, German 
development cooperation initially exercised re-
straint, but then became increasingly sensitive to 
crises (even taking specific measures). Explicitly 
conflict-related commitment was demonstrated 
primarily by non-governmental organizations. 
The civil war in El Salvador was not reflected in 
German development cooperation. After the peace 
treaty had been concluded, development coopera-
tion began by being directly related to the conflict 
situation or peace process. Since the mid-1990s, 
however, a further change to "normal" develop-
ment cooperation can be seen. 
The conflict situation in Kenya has been consid-
ered in German development cooperation only 
since the early 1990s. Efforts in this respect have 
focused on exerting political pressure (policy dia-
logue and conditionality) with a view to bringing 
about changes. There is no evidence of more radi-
cal strategies (an item in the 1993 country concept 
for supporting the process of democratization) 
being implemented. Some explicitly conflict-
related measures have been taken by NGOs. 
Initially, the Tuareg uprising had little influence 
on German development cooperation with Mali. 
There was no response to occasional calls for the 
suspension of development cooperation, since the 
latter was, in the BMZ's view, meant to help pre-
vent a new military dictatorship from taking 
power. At the time of the peace process an explic-
itly conflict-related measure was implemented as 
a step towards the stabilization of northern Mali.  
The conflict situation before the genocide began 
had little influence on German development coop-
eration with Rwanda. At conceptual level and as 
regards specific measures this changed only 
slightly after the genocide. A resumption of de-
velopment cooperation was seen as an obvious 
duty. Shifts of emphasis can be detected in Ger-
man development cooperation, but no substantial 
changes of approach. 
Development cooperation with Sri Lanka in the 
1990s has adjusted partly implicitly and partly 
explicitly (specific measures) to the conflict situa-
tion. However, there is to be no focus of attention 
on the conflict. Some NGOs can, moreover, oper-
ate in ways and areas that are impossible for offi-
cial development cooperation (activities in areas 
controlled by the LTTE). 
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3.5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions 
In principle, it can be said that the influence which 
German development cooperation and the whole 
international donor community can bring to bear 
on conflict situations is very limited; this is par-
ticularly true of acute conflicts (open confronta-
tion phase). 
German development cooperation generally 
shows there to have been a tendency for sensitiv-
ity to conflict situations to grow significantly in 
the 1990s. This is not least due to the fact that de-
velopment cooperation has become "more politi-
cal" since the early 1990s – roughly along the 
lines of the five development cooperation crite-
ria – and to the link that has been forged to such 
issues as "human rights" and "democratization". 
Despite this positive tendency, development co-
operation actors are often insufficiently aware of 
conflict situations. Conceptually, not enough at-
tention is paid to this aspect; there are no real 
"conflict strategies" for the countries concerned, 
as part of country concepts, for example. This is a 
major deficiency not only in countries particularly 
hard hit by conflicts (such as Rwanda) but also in 
countries where memories of conflict situations 
are fading (such as El Salvador). 
Conflict situations have influenced German de-
velopment cooperation in the past, significantly in 
some cases. As a rule, this has not been ade-
quately considered, and few conclusions have 
been drawn for the German approach. 
It is therefore important to refer to the difference 
that exists between reactive conflict-induced ad-
justment and an explicit sensitivity to conflicts 
and strategy for addressing them. 
Development cooperation can react to conflict 
situations in many ways. The actors are, however, 
often unaware of the options open to German de-
velopment cooperation for responding construc-
tively to conflict situations, this being particularly 
true of countries in the period before conflicts be-
come violent (e.g. Kenya). 
Recommendations 
⇒ Greater advantage should be taken of the de-
velopment cooperation options in conflict 
situations so that conflict strategies for Ger-
man development cooperation based on 
greater awareness may be devised and im-
plemented. 
⇒ Possible graded forms of reaction by the 
BMZ in conflict situations (see the section on 
"Development cooperation strategies") should 
be more transparent and considered more 
purposefully in country and other strategic 
discussions. The options available to develop-
ment cooperation for developing conflict-
related measures should be more widely pub-
licized in the BMZ and the implementing 
agencies. 
⇒ The division of labour between NGOs and 
official development cooperation agencies, or 
the duplication of effort, should be considered 
and discussed with the non-governmental or-
ganizations (country discussions and similar 
fora) so that joint objectives may be pursued 
in conflict situations and suitable areas for as-
sistance sought. 
⇒ The need for "conflict-related country discus-
sions" (attended by the BMZ, FO, implement-
ing agencies, NGOs and experts/researchers) 
should be considered. 
⇒ In countries where there is a recognizable 
potential for conflict the country concept 
must take adequate account of this potential. 
It should both undertake a brief analysis of 
the conflict situation and ask what options 
there might be for German development co-
operation on this basis. 
⇒ The five development cooperation criteria 
should be supplemented and developed (pos-
sibly as part of the existing category of "ori-
entation of government action towards devel-
opment") to include an item that analyses and 
appraises "willingness to prevent crises" and 
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the "desire of the government and other war-
ring parties for peace". 
⇒ In conflict situations it should be considered 
whether policy dialogue is likely to address 
conflict-related problems. This is also 
particularly true of the ways in which German 
development cooperation can influence the 
multilateral policy dialogue. The conditions 
should be explicit and specific. 
4 Impact of German Development Co-
operation on Actual and Potential 
Conflict Situations 
Analysing the impact of German development 
cooperation on actual or potential conflict situa-
tions is methodologically difficult. This is true 
both of the macro level – i.e. the influence of 
German development cooperation as a whole on a 
conflict – and of the level of individual projects 
and programmes (micro level). 
The following factors are relevant to the difficul-
ties encountered in impact analysis: 
— There are many factors that may influence 
potential and actual conflict situations. Ger-
man development cooperation is only one 
variable, to which decisive importance should 
not normally be attached, as against internal 
and other external factors. 
— In view of the complexity of conflict situa-
tions there are no simple impact chains (e.g. 
"an action of type A leads to a reaction or has 
an impact of type B"). 
— German development cooperation is of very 
limited relevance not least because it is but 
one part of the whole spectrum of develop-
ment cooperation (and its often marginal 
relevance to conflicts) of the international 
donor community. It is frequently impossible 
to isolate the impacts that one donor has had. 
— A question that always arises is whether the 
behaviour of a party to a conflict (the gov-
ernment, say) can be ascribed to a given ac-
tion (e.g. in the form of the policy dialogue) 
by a donor or the whole donor community 
(problem of attribution). 
— In the past (until about the early 1990s) there 
were, moreover, virtually no conflict-specific 
objectives in German development coopera-
tion that might have been used to analyse cer-
tain impacts or impact indicators. 
Accurate or even quantitative impact analysis is 
impossible in these circumstances. 
Despite these methodological problems, the eval-
uations of the six countries contain a wide range 
of findings on the impacts of German develop-
ment cooperation on potential and actual conflict 
situations. These findings are predominantly 
based on plausibility considerations and situation 
assessments. 
It should also be emphasized that the findings on 
German development cooperation presented here 
consider only conflict-related aspects. The possi-
ble benefits for (other) development or humanitar-
ian objectives are not therefore analysed and ap-
praised. 
4.1 Macro Level: General Impact on 
Potential and Actual Conflict 
Situations 
The six country studies do not agree in their con-
clusions on the overall impact of German devel-
opment cooperation on potential and actual con-
flict situations. 
The conclusion drawn by three country analyses 
(Kenya, Mali and Sri Lanka) is, by and large, 
fairly positive (German development cooperation 
has helped to remove causes of conflicts, to pre-
vent escalation or to resolve conflicts). One coun-
try study comes to a generally negative conclusion 
(Rwanda). One study is, on the whole, ambivalent 
in its views on impact (Ethiopia), and a further 
country study concludes that, all in all, no direct 
impacts can be demonstrated (El Salvador). 
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When these conclusions are examined, however, it 
should be emphasized that all the country studies 
identify and stress the simultaneous existence of 
opposite tendencies (ambivalence); in other 
words, in every case examples can be found of 
German development cooperation exacerbating 
potential or actual conflict situations and also 
making positive contributions. The overall ap-
praisal of development cooperation in the various 
countries thus depends on the specific situation 
and weighting in each case. 
The country evaluations are partly explicit and 
partly implicit in expressing views on the question 
Table 3: General Impact of Development Cooperation on Potential and Actual Conflict Situations in the Six Countries 
Evaluated 
 Positive impacts Negative impacts Overall impact Intensity of influence 
Ethiopia Impacts in certain areas 
that defuse conflict in 
the long term (removal 
of causes of conflict) 
International develop-
ment cooperation 
keeps regime in power 
No attempt to defuse 
conflict 
Positive and negative 
impacts 
Low to medium 
El Salvador Reaction to current 
needs 
Support in principle for 
government as party to 
conflict 
Counterproductive 
consequences for Ger-
man development co-
operation because con-
flict situation neglected 
No direct impacts de-
monstrable 
Low 
Kenya Promotion of democ-
ratization process 
Building of public 
awareness 
Violent reactions by 
regime following pres-
sure for democratiza-
tion 
Strengthening of local 
clientele systems 
Predominantly positive 
results 
High 
Mali Peaceful resolution of 
Tuareg conflict and 
handling of its political 
and economic conse-
quences 
Acceleration of the 
pressure to modernize 
On the whole, very 
positive 
High 
Rwanda Moderating influence 
on regime 
Stabilization of regime Contradictory impacts, 
with German develop-
ment cooperation tend-
ing to exacerbate con-
flict 
Low to medium 
Sri Lanka Removal of causes of 
conflict and strength-
ening of conflict reso-
lution mechanisms 
De facto strengthening 
of government as party 
to conflict 
Predominantly positive 
impacts 
Low 
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of how strong was the overall influence – positive 
and/or negative – of German development coop-
eration on the various potential and actual conflict 
situations. In Kenya and Mali it is found to have 
been strong, although it should be emphasized that 
this influence relates to certain events, phases or 
regions (in Mali's case, for example, to the rele-
vant parts of the north of the country). In the other 
four countries studied the influence of German 
development cooperation was fairly limited, partly 
demonstrable or assumed. 
4.1.1 Positive Impacts 
The positive overall influence of German devel-
opment cooperation on potential and actual con-
flict situations in the six countries studied can be 
summarized under the following five headings: 
— Contributions to the eventual removal of 
structural causes of conflicts: German devel-
opment cooperation as a whole makes an im-
portant positive contribution in cases where it 
can help to defuse the causes of conflicts (e.g. 
Ethiopia, Mali, Rwanda and Sri Lanka). In 
these cases the sum of development coopera-
tion measures ultimately makes an effective 
contribution to the removal of the causes of 
conflicts. Development cooperation can have 
an impact of this kind in a wide range of 
"classical" spheres if they are associated with 
potential conflicts or causes of conflicts. Ex-
amples of this (see also the comments below) 
include country programmes which are 
geared to the removal of regional and eco-
nomic disparities, have poverty alleviation as 
their goal, help to defuse conflicts over re-
sources (and especially land) by population 
policy means, create employment opportuni-
ties, etc. 
— Contributions to short- and medium-term po-
litical and social stabilization through recon-
struction: German development cooperation 
as a whole has been able to contribute to the 
stabilization of countries or individual re-
gions. This is particularly true of countries 
that have concluded peace accords, but con-
tinue to have a latent or pronounced tendency 
to be faced with crises (e.g. El Salvador and 
Mali) or are in an acute conflict situation, 
which does, however, permit or indicate the 
wisdom of stabilizing measures in certain ar-
eas (Sri Lanka). 
— Contributions to political openness, partici-
pation, democratization and conflict aware-
ness: Taken as a whole, German development 
cooperation is able to contribute to political 
openness, to the improved participation of the 
people in decision-making processes and so 
to democratization. 
The political pressure associated with devel-
opment cooperation can be a decisive cause 
of or contribution to a country's democratiza-
tion. This is especially true of Kenya, where 
the purposeful application of conditionality 
has helped in this respect. In Ethiopia it has 
not been possible to change the political sys-
tem decisively as an overarching general 
condition, but toeing the political line is now 
less common (as a result of socio-political ac-
tivities, for example). As many measures that 
do not have any explicitly political orienta-
tion do include elements of participation and 
as authority and power are in many cases be-
ing shifted to local levels through a decentral-
ized approach, the sum of development coop-
eration measures often tends to weaken the 
causes of conflicts and to strengthen conflict 
settlement mechanisms (in Sri Lanka, for in-
stance). With targeted measures it has also 
been possible to help increase society's con-
flict awareness and reduce its willingness to 
resort to conflict and violence. This has been 
experienced in Mali and (owing to Church 
measures) Kenya. 
— Contributions to the achievement of security 
and respect for human rights through the 
presence of development cooperation staff: 
The presence of foreign development coop-
eration personnel can make for a high level of 
transparency and communication as regards 
the conflict situation in a region or country. In 
Sri Lanka and, to some extent, Rwanda this 
helped to improve the security and human 
rights situation. It was therefore possible to 
curb the behaviour of armed militias and in-
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timidation by members of the armed forces 
(at the security forces' checkpoints, for exam-
ple), etc. or at least to pass on appropriate in-
formation (to the embassy, inquiries ad-
dressed to government agencies, etc.). 
— Elimination of self-enrichment opportunities 
for groups willing to resort to violence 
through economic reform programmes / 
structural adjustment: There are some indica-
tions (Ethiopia) that economic reform pack-
ages triggered or supported by structural ad-
justment programmes (with appropriate mul-
tilateral or bilateral components in the form 
of credits or conditionality) can help to re-
move acquisition or enrichment structures 
(through the privatization of state-owned en-
terprises, etc.).23 
4.1.2 Negative Impacts 
The negative overall influence of German devel-
opment cooperation on the potential and actual 
conflict situations in the six countries studied can 
be summarized under the following six headings 
(some of which are linked):  
— Governmental development cooperation di-
rectly supports and stabilizes the government, 
which is itself one of the warring parties: As 
a general rule, bilateral German development 
cooperation supports and stabilizes the gov-
ernment of the partner country. In most of the 
countries studied this means direct political 
and physical support for the party to the con-
flict that holds the reins of government. In 
countries such as Ethiopia, El Salvador, 
Kenya, Rwanda and Sri Lanka this is a fun-
damental problem, which does, however, dif-
fer widely from one country to another. The 
apparatus of state in each case is developed 
and supported by international (including 
German) development cooperation. Countries 
such as Ethiopia and Kenya are heavily de-
pendent on development cooperation funds, 
even – in the final analysis – for their ability 
                                                     
23 However, the opposite has also occurred; see below. 
to wage war. This means that, indirectly at 
least, Germany, as a donor country, "ap-
proves" the various practices and "rewards" 
the approach even of repressive regimes, as in 
Rwanda under Habyarimana and the Front 
Patriotique Rwandais/FPR, in Ethiopia under 
Meles Zenawi and in El Salvador under 
Duarte. Something of a gradation is achieved 
through the degree of autonomy allowed the 
government of the partner country in the 
utilization of development cooperation re-
sources. In the case of El Salvador, for exam-
ple, the Duarte government was able, for a 
time at least, to make direct use of German 
development cooperation resources, since 
they largely consisted of commodity aid, 
whereas the strict conditions attached in 
Kenya's case imposed much tighter limits on 
the government. 
In all development cooperation measures the 
support for and stabilization of the apparatus 
of state is also reflected in the fact that, as a 
rule, the whole project portfolio is useful to 
the government (because it would not other-
wise request, support or permit the measures) 
and the cooperation is largely or completely 
confined to government counterparts (e.g. El 
Salvador). 
— "Omission" and "approval" result in oppor-
tunities to exercise influence being missed 
and in incorrect signals being given: As ad-
vantage has not been taken of openings for 
policy dialogue and for more effective coor-
dination of official and non-governmental de-
velopment cooperation, opportunities for ex-
ercising constructive influence have been 
missed in Ethiopia. The absence of criticism 
and the indirect approval of government ac-
tion (as in Rwanda) may exacerbate the con-
flict if opposition forces feel discouraged and 
peaceful opposition work is endangered as a 
result. 
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Box 4: Stabilization of the Political System by Devel-
opment Cooperation: the Case of Ethiopia 
Ethiopia has received more assistance from the interna-
tional donor community in the 1990s than virtually any 
other African country. The repression, the absence of po-
litical pluralism, the human rights violations and the re-
strictions on the freedom of speech have been scarcely 
noticed or criticized by the donor community – including 
its German representatives – in the past, although the re-
pressive nature of the regime represents considerable po-
tential for conflict. 
International development cooperation transfers are the 
regime's "lifeblood". Germany accounts for about 8 % of 
the total development cooperation volume. The close co-
operation with the Ethiopian government with no condi-
tions attached fosters the dominance of the minority ethnic 
group that runs the country. The majority of development 
cooperation projects support the government directly or 
indirectly. The support provided by development coopera-
tion is criticized by opposition forces. 
The fact that development cooperation has neglected the 
political factor has resulted in official and, to some extent, 
non-governmental assistance possibly having the effect of 
exacerbating the crisis by consolidating a system that stirs 
up conflicts by exercising total control over society and 
excluding some social groups. 
— Development cooperation may act as an in-
centive for conflict by encouraging clientele 
systems and corruption: Development coop-
eration represents an inflow of resources that 
may encourage clientele systems at national, 
regional or local level and open the way or 
increase the opportunities for corruption. This 
incentive may be problematical primarily be-
cause groups may resort to violence to defend 
their privileges. These unintended impacts 
have been seen in Kenya and – for a time – in 
El Salvador, where they resulted in develop-
ment cooperation contributing to increased 
competition for goods and privileges that 
were to be distributed. This may exacerbate 
conflicts and lead to polarization. In Kenya 
the government resorted to violent counter-
measures to prevent such clientele systems 
from being broken up. In El Salvador Ger-
man development cooperation could be criti-
cized for at least indirectly encouraging the 
corrupt behaviour of politicians of the Chris-
tian Democratic Party, which must be seen as 
one of the main causes of the slowness of re-
forms and thus, in the final analysis, of prob-
lems facing the country. 
— The regional orientation of development co-
operation may exacerbate imbalances or 
strengthen the position of government elites 
in certain regions: In some cases24 German 
development cooperation has helped to con-
solidate regional disparities or given more as-
sistance to certain regions which the elite 
want to see privileged. In Rwanda, for exam-
ple, particular attention was paid to the places 
where the elite lived when the locations for 
German projects were chosen. In El Salvador 
it was found that development cooperation 
resources were being passed on in a distorted 
and one-sided way through a governmental 
counterpart to regions that had "voted for the 
right party", which can be expected eventu-
ally to be conducive to conflict. 
In the north of Mali political conflicts may be 
encouraged in the future if the donors con-
tinue to adopt an unbalanced regional ap-
proach (hitherto no international develop-
ment cooperation with the part of the north-
ern region that does not benefit from German 
development cooperation). 
— Pressure for political reform exerted by de-
velopment cooperation may prompt the re-
gime to take violent countermeasures: In 
Kenya's case the (short-term) reaction to pres-
sure for political reform has been violent 
counteraction by the regime. Although the 
donors have been able to bring about some 
political reforms, the defensive reaction con-
sisted in enormous obstacles placed in the 
path of the opposition, the harassment of the 
critical press and the instigation of bloody 
ethnic clashes by hardliners in the ruling 
party. Added to this, the donors' pressure re-
sulted in some of the conflicts being shifted 
from national to regional and local level. As 
the sinecures for the clientele system were re-
                                                     
24 The report on Ethiopia explicitly refers to the lack of 
evidence of development cooperation having contributed 
to regional disparities. 
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duced in number at national level, attempts 
were made to replace them at lower levels. 
— Development cooperation may block work to 
eliminate causes of conflict by easing the 
pressure on the government to take action 
("taker mentality"): In Rwanda (and, with 
qualifications, Ethiopia) German develop-
ment cooperation, which contributes to "over-
aiding" in the context of total international 
development cooperation, has resulted in the 
state ignoring many of the tasks it should be 
performing. The "internationalization" of 
government tasks has eased the pressure that 
is needed if causes of conflicts are to be 
eliminated. This situation has also resulted in 
policy dialogue and conditionality being less 
effective or even completely ineffective, 
since the government concerned can obtain 
more development cooperation resources than 
are actually needed. 
4.1.3 Other Problematical Impacts 
The negative impacts of German development 
cooperation referred to above are joined by a 
number of other impacts that have proved to be 
problematical in individual cases or may exacer-
bate conflicts, especially in the short term, while 
having a positive impact in the medium and long 
term. 
— Exacerbation of conflicts due to the with-
drawal of development cooperation: In cer-
tain circumstances the evacuation of devel-
opment cooperation personnel or the (tempo-
rary) shutdown of a development cooperation 
project may have the effect of exacerbating a 
conflict (e.g. Rwanda). While the presence of 
development cooperation personnel ensures a 
degree of international transparency, the 
withdrawal of certain development coopera-
tion structures may send a signal that encour-
Table 4: Possible Positive, Negative and Problematical Impacts of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations 
Possible positive impacts / contributions Possible negative impacts / contributions 
– Eventual removal of causes of conflicts (regional disparities, 
employment opportunities, defusing of conflicts over re-
sources, etc.) 
– Political and social stabilization in the short and medium 
term due to reconstruction efforts 
– Political openness, participation, democratization and in-
crease in conflict awareness of societies and political systems 
– Achievement of security and improved human rights condi-
tions due to the presence of development cooperation person-
nel 
– Removal of opportunities for self-enrichment and of clientele 
systems by means of economic reform programmes / struc-
tural adjustment 
– Direct support for and stabilization of the government 
(through official development cooperation), which is it-
self a party to the conflict 
– Wrong signals sent to the government and opposition 
forces through "omission" (e.g. failure to seize opportuni-
ties during the policy dialogue) and "approval" 
– Exacerbation of the conflict through the encouragement 
given to clientele systems and opportunities for corrup-
tion 
– Increased regional imbalances through the promotion of 
certain regions to the ruling elite's liking 
– Violent countermeasures taken by the regime as a result 
of pressure for political reform (eventually, however, re-
moval of potential for violence) 
– Easing of the pressure exerted by development coopera-
tion for action to deal with the causes of conflicts ("inter-
nationalization" of government tasks) 
Other problematical impacts 
– Possible exacerbation of conflicts by the shutdown of projects or the withdrawal of personnel in acute conflict situations 
– Increase in the pressure for modernization 
– Increase in competitive behaviour in the public sector due to economic reform programmes or structural adjustment 
– Absence of influence on measures taken by multilateral donors that exacerbate conflicts 
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ages conflict (decline in legal certainty in a 
region, less transparency as regards the be-
haviour of security forces, etc.). 
— Increase in the pressure for modernization: 
German development cooperation made a 
discernible contribution to the pressure for 
modernization in Mali and Rwanda. The as-
sociated change of technologies, economic 
systems and forms of social organization is 
(bound to be) conducive to conflict. In the 
population groups involved in the moderniza-
tion process the changes mainly give rise to 
hopes and expectations (in connection with, 
say, irrigated farming) which cannot be ful-
filled, or at least not entirely.25 Such situa-
tions may cause disappointment and social 
conflicts. 
— Economic reforms or structural adjustment 
may increase the potential for conflict: The 
structural adjustment promoted by the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank – and the policy therefore indirectly 
supported by Germany – may have had the 
effect of exacerbating the conflict in Rwanda 
(before the genocide). In connection with the 
structural adjustment policy the number of 
elite positions paid for by the state was re-
duced. This meant that most Hutu officials 
had less opportunity for social advancement 
through promotion to lucrative high-level 
posts; this has contributed to militant com-
petitive behaviour. 
— Insufficient influence on measures of multi-
lateral donors that exacerbate conflicts: In 
some cases at least the development coopera-
tion measures of multilateral institutions also 
have impacts that exacerbate conflicts. In 
principle, Germany has the opportunity to be 
directly involved in the decision-making, 
programmes, etc. through the appropriate su-
pervisory bodies. Experience in Rwanda, for 
example, indicates that the settlement policy 
                                                     
25 It should be pointed out that as part of German develop-
ment cooperation with Mali advice was offered in con-
nection with the modernization process to help cushion 
the risks involved. 
supported by the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees/UNHCR and United 
Nations Development Programme/UNDP ex-
acerbated the conflict. The German Govern-
ment could therefore have pressed for re-
views or changes in these international insti-
tutions. 
4.2 Micro Level: Project-specific Im-
pacts on Potential and Actual 
Conflict Situations 
At the level of individual development coopera-
tion measures ("micro level") various intended 
and unintended positive and negative impacts on 
potential and actual conflict situations can simi-
larly be detected. A distinction should be made 
between measures with a conflict-specific objec-
tive (explicitly conflict-related measures) and 
measures without conflict-specific objectives 
(non-conflict-related measures). 
It must be assumed that the possible overall posi-
tive or negative impact of the majority of all indi-
vidual development cooperation measures on a 
country is slight. Nonetheless, the measures may 
become highly significant at regional or local 
level (example: "Northern Mali Programme"; see 
below). There are also indications that some de-
velopment cooperation projects at least are ex-
tremely relevant at national level. 
4.2.1 Explicitly Conflict-related Meas-
ures (Positive and Negative 
Impacts)26 
Experience of conflict-specific measures of offi-
cial German development cooperation and of non-
governmental development cooperation reveals 
                                                     
26 For a description of these measures see section 2.3. The 
measure known as "Psychological counselling for chil-
dren and young people" mentioned in section 2.3 is not 
considered here, since the project has not advanced be-
yond the stage of preliminary deliberations. 
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predominantly positive impacts on potential and 
actual conflict situations. 
Demobilization and Reintegration of Combatants 
Some measures taken to demobilize and reinte-
grate combatants in Ethiopia immediately after 
the fall of the Mengistu regime helped to avert the 
potential danger of serious military intervention. 
A number of project elements in El Salvador (Ob-
sidiana project) were also successful (in terms of 
reintegration); what was of primary importance 
here was the linking of the housing component to 
the target group's self-organization and the exem-
plary collaboration between official and non-
governmental development cooperation (Misere-
or). 
However, some of the experience of demobiliza-
tion and reintegration efforts was negative. The 
efforts made to demobilize Tigréan fighters in 
Ethiopia, which were supported by the GTZ as 
part of the Dansha project, helped to increase po-
litical tensions. The project was perceived in the 
region as establishing a "defensive village" of Ti-
gréan colonization, giving rise to considerable 
discord among the local Amharic people and the 
local elites. A definitive assessment cannot be 
made of the impacts which the training courses for 
former combatants had on the process of consoli-
dation in El Salvador, since there is no study or 
anything similar on their whereabouts. A German 
financial cooperation project entailing the con-
struction of modest apartments for former soldiers 
in El Salvador, which had been set up for "politi-
cal reasons" with the aim of putting the target 
group on an equal footing with the former guerril-
las (especially through efforts in the form of hous-
ing construction) was not very successful. This 
was due to the difference between the needs of the 
two target groups, the guerrillas having been 
without civilian housing far longer than the regu-
lar soldiers. 
Comments in Rwanda on other donors' demobili-
zation programmes indicate that they served pri-
marily to increase the efficiency of the military 
apparatus and so proved counterproductive. 
Democratization Assistance 
In Ethiopia the democratization assistance pro-
vided by the Foreign Office in the form of elec-
tion monitoring (1992 and 1995) helped to give 
the donors information for their assessment of the 
elections; this also made it possible to gather in-
formation on election rigging. The country 
evaluation concludes, however, that the results of 
the election monitoring were not adequately re-
flected in German development cooperation. 
Rehabilitation and Integration of War Victims 
An important and direct contribution to coping 
with the consequences of war was made by the 
"GTZ ISRI Orthopaedic Project" in El Salvador. 
It also had positive spillover effects on various 
institutions involved and on the country's policy 
towards the disabled. 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of War-dam-
aged Facilities and Comprehensive Programmes 
for Social, Political and Economic Stabilization 
On the whole, extensive rehabilitation and stabili-
zation programmes in Mali and Sri Lanka have 
proved very successful. The measures feature an 
approach that includes a range of activities. 
The impacts of the "Northern Mali Programme" 
on the potential for conflict and the conflict situa-
tion include the following: 
— effective support was given to the process of 
social and economic stabilization in parts of 
the regions affected by the Tuareg conflict; 
— society's conflict awareness was fostered; 
— society's willingness to resort to conflict and 
violence was reduced; 
— security in the region was improved and ban-
ditry curbed; 
— understanding between the warring parties 
was improved with the help of reconciliation 
meetings. 
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Box 5: The "Northern Mali Programme" 
Background to the programme and its profile 
During the intergovernmental negotiations in 1993 the 
German government promised the Malian government that 
it would support its efforts to develop the North, to reinte-
grate the population there and to restore peace to the re-
gion. Special financial cooperation resources of DM 30m, 
which German Minister Spranger promised as a "peace and 
democracy premium" during a visit (1993), were set aside 
for this purpose; DM 2m in technical cooperation re-
sources was also provided. The initial project activities 
began in June 1994. 
The stated objective of the "Northern Mali Programme" is 
to support the process of social and economic stabilization 
in the regions of northern Mali affected by the "Tuareg 
conflict" and so to help pacify the area on the basis of the 
programme of aid and development agreed in the Pacte 
National in April 1992. 
The programme consists of the following components: 
– emergency aid measures for returning Tuareg and 
Moors who were living in various refugee camps, 
– emergency aid measures for displaced persons (espe-
cially Bellahs), 
– short- and medium-term income-generating measures 
for reintegrating refugees and displaced persons and 
simultaneously assisting the local population, 
– investment programme for the reconstruction of dam-
aged infrastructure. 
The "Northern Mali programme" is coordinated by two 
German experts and a Malian staff member. The pro-
gramme team is advised on all fundamental and program-
matic matters by a Comité Consultatif, which includes 
important representatives of civil society in the project 
region. 
Impacts of the programme 
The programme has succeeded in making a major 
contribution to the peaceful resolution of the Tuareg 
conflict and to the repair of the political and economic 
damage done. Refugees and displaced persons have 
returned to their homes. In the programme region security 
has been restored, and the ethnic groups are reconciled and 
live peacefully together. Conflicts are addressed openly 
and, for the most part, resolved without recourse to 
violence. The programme is also succeeding in reducing major 
causes of the conflict – above all, structural and regional 
marginalization and inadequate development dynamism. 
 
If new conflicts are to be prevented, it is important 
to ensure that in the future development coopera-
tion measures are also implemented in the other 
regions of northern Mali, which German devel-
opment cooperation has not been able to cover in 
the past. 
Although the focal areas of and background to the 
three measures in Sri Lanka (the Jaffna Rehabili-
tation Project/JRP, the Integrated Food Security 
Programme/IFSP in Trincomalee and the Water 
Supply and Sanitation Project/WSSP in Vavuniya 
/ Mannar) are very different, what they do have in 
common is that they are located on the very 
fringes of territory over which the Sri Lankan 
government has regained control and are having 
far-reaching impacts and that – in the case of the 
Jaffna and Trincomalee measures – they adopt a 
"broad" approach (i.e. they are comparatively 
closely related to practical needs and less to a cer-
tain sector). The most important impacts include 
the following: 
— the measures are contributing to the general 
normalization and stabilization of the region; 
— the JRP in particular may form the point of 
departure for diplomatic peace initiatives or 
something similar; 
— the measures are improving the international 
transparency of conflict situations; 
— the JRP and IFSP are showing the way (in 
pacification, in coping with the consequences 
of war, etc.) to other donors and, to some ex-
tent, the Sri Lankan government (post-
conflict preparedness); 
— the measures may be creating assets that the 
warring parties may hesitate to destroy; 
— the measures are helping to reduce breaches 
of the law, violations of human rights and 
arbitrary acts. 
It should be emphasized that the conflict-reducing 
impacts of the measures should not in any way be 
overrated, given the difficult conflict situation. 
They may play a supporting role, but not a leading 
role. 
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Project for Strengthening the Judicial System 
The GTZ project in Rwanda is primarily intended 
to develop a central database in the prosecutor 
general's office to support the genocide procedural 
law and pending genocide trials. In the short term 
the project is unlikely to reduce tension, since it 
will help to bolster the fiction that a legal solution 
to the genocide trials is possible, and in the me-
dium term it will confirm the impossibility of cop-
ing with the trials. In the long term, however, it 
may have the effect of reducing tension by help-
ing to overcome the prevailing "culture of impu-
nity". 
NGO Measures with an Explicitly Conflict-
specific Objective27 
Most conflict-specific NGO measures make an 
important positive contribution. Many NGO ac-
tivities – especially those of the Political Founda-
tions (as in Kenya) – are not prompted by poten-
tial or actual conflicts, but pursue goals in the 
spheres of "democracy" and "human rights" (po-
sitive measures). 
The following impacts are particularly important: 
— The sometimes violent reactions of regimes 
(especially in Kenya and Ethiopia) to con-
flict-related NGO activities indicate that these 
activities have some relevance and thus effec-
tiveness. 
— In some cases conflict-related work by NGOs 
– and especially the Political Foundations – is 
hampered or even completely prevented by 
the governments of the countries concerned. 
In Ethiopia the Political Foundations are 
given little scope to use their instruments. In 
Kenya the foundations' education work was 
regarded with considerable suspicion and 
constantly obstructed. The head of the Frie-
drich Naumann Foundation has been expelled 
from the country on several occasions, and 
the foundation has been forced to close its of-
fice. 
                                                     
27 See also the comments below. 
— The measures for the promotion of democ-
racy and human rights cannot be equated per 
se with crisis de-escalation, since in the short 
and medium term they may sometimes help 
directly to bring a conflict to a head if the re-
gime takes violent countermeasures. In the 
long term, however, they may do a great deal 
to reduce the potential for violence and the 
causes of conflict. 
— Through the work of the Political Founda-
tions criticism has been voiced about social 
issues in Ethiopia. In the medium term the 
culture of seminars and symposia supported 
by the foundations will contribute to conflict 
recognition by society and is likely to pro-
mote willingness to resolve conflicts by 
peaceful means. 
— The work of the Political Foundations has 
performed something of a protective function 
for critics of the regime in Ethiopia. 
— The work of the Political Foundations in 
Ethiopia has proved to be equivocal, since it 
has helped to stabilize government institu-
tions. 
— In Kenya the Political Foundations' educa-
tional measures in the political field have 
made a major contribution to the country's 
democratization and so reduced the potential 
for violence. The most important impacts re-
late to (1) improvement of the quality of po-
litical debate, (2) an increase in society's con-
flict awareness and (3) the removal of ten-
dencies for society to polarize. 
— In El Salvador the German Churches were 
able to give strong support to the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict in the form of hu-
man, ideological and physical resources. 
— Direct measures taken by the Churches to 
resolve conflicts in areas of unrest have had 
the effect of promoting peace in Kenya. They 
have helped to bring about greater transpar-
ency in political processes and to improve the 
quality of political debate at national and lo-
cal level, and they have contributed to the de-
bate on reforms. 
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— A reconciliation project of the Heinrich Böll 
Foundation in Kenya greatly increased the 
political awareness of simple peasants and 
fostered a desire for peaceful co-existence 
among the victims of violence. 
— Support for impartial magazines and maga-
zines close to the Church helped to defuse the 
conflict in Rwanda (assisted by Brot für die 
Welt, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, and 
others). 
Besides actual impacts, the following observations 
and findings are relevant: 
— In some cases NGOs are operating with con-
flict-specific measures in an area where offi-
cial German development cooperation is not 
represented or cannot operate. This is true, for 
example, of Kenya and the areas controlled 
by the LTTE (uncleared areas) in Sri Lanka. 
— A problem that may in principle arise in con-
flict situations is that NGOs' local partners do 
not have the freedom to operate in socio-
political spheres (e.g. Ethiopia). 
— The work of the Political Foundations in par-
ticular may be difficult because they do not 
automatically find suitable partners waiting 
for them (as the Churches do); the founda-
tions face the added danger of their work be-
ing eclipsed by party political considerations 
(e.g. El Salvador). 
4.2.2 Non-conflict-specific Measures 
(Positive and Negative Impacts) 
At the level of individual development coopera-
tion measures, which are not specifically geared to 
conflicts, a wide variety of intended and unin-
tended impacts can be identified in the countries 
studied. Non-conflict-specific measures form the 
bulk of all official German development coopera-
tion activities in the countries considered. 
Positive Impacts 
Contributions to the Eventual Removal of Causes 
of Conflicts or Factors that Exacerbate Conflicts 
German development cooperation measures prob-
ably have their greatest positive impact through 
the general benefits they have for development. 
They may be, for example, projects and pro-
grammes concerning the protection of natural re-
sources or the population policy sphere. They may 
lead to the removal of causes of conflicts or fac-
tors that exacerbate conflicts. Not even an ap-
proximate quantification of positive impacts is, 
however, possible. 
The development cooperation measures concerned 
may produce inconsistent results: while the Ger-
man development cooperation commitment as a 
whole directly and indirectly supports and stabi-
lizes a regime, the various measures being imple-
mented at micro level may have a positive impact 
on the aspects of conflict referred to here. 
The following examples can be given of positive 
impacts that "classical" development cooperation 
measures have on potential and actual conflict 
situations: 
— In Ethiopia German development cooperation 
measures are making positive contributions 
through activities in the areas of food secu-
rity, poverty alleviation and resource protec-
tion. 
— A rural settlement project on the coast of 
Kenya helped to reduce national disparities. 
— Various employment promotion and voca-
tional training schemes in Sri Lanka are help-
ing to weaken causes of and potential for con-
flict, such as economic marginalization. 
Contributions to the Removal of Clientelist Struc-
tures, Improved Participation and Decentraliza-
tion 
A number of German development cooperation 
measures are visibly helping to remove clientelist 
structures, to improve participation and to bring 
about decentralization, although the actual project 
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objectives relate to "classical" areas of develop-
ment (such as water supply). These impacts are 
achieved because the project approach is appro-
priately designed (cooperation with local actors, 
specific approaches to participation, etc.) or be-
cause, seen from the angle of individual develop-
ment cooperation measures, there is a need for 
certain general conditions to be adjusted by the 
partner (e.g. a sectoral policy). A change in cer-
tain general conditions is brought about particu-
larly by means of implicit or explicit condition-
ality at project or sectoral level. 
The following examples of these forms of positive 
impacts can be given: 
— A regional development programme in Kenya 
(Transmara) was confronted directly with 
conflicts over land use and land ownership. It 
helped to teach the local people about land 
rights and limited the options open to the lo-
cal clientele system. This enabled an impor-
tant step to be taken in reducing the potential 
for conflict at local level. 
— Measures in Sri Lanka in favour of the rural 
population (access to small loans, promotion 
of self-help, etc.) are also associated with an 
increase in political participation. 
— Assistance for urban water supply projects 
(financial cooperation) in Kenya was made 
conditional on the establishment of independ-
ent water works operating on a commercial 
basis in the towns concerned; the scheme thus 
made a contribution to decentralization and 
the removal of local clientele systems. 
— A slum clearance project in Kenya generated 
potential for violence in the short term be-
cause it was, in the final analysis, to the dis-
advantage of the local system of patronage. In 
the long term, however, it contributed to the 
reduction of the potential for violence be-
cause it helped to oust clientelism. 
Negative Impacts 
Strengthening Regimes through "Decentraliza-
tion" 
It was found that decentralization measures in 
Ethiopia and El Salvador ran the risk of helping 
the government to improve its control structures 
and thus supporting repressive mechanisms. 
How this occurs is evident from the example of El 
Salvador. With the support of German develop-
ment cooperation the strengthening of the munici-
palities was stepped up while the Duarte govern-
ment was in power. The Partido Demócrata Cris-
tiano/PDC government tried to gain at least some 
legitimacy by promoting local structures. This 
policy also served to extend the government's in-
fluence over the communes located in areas of 
conflict. The guerrillas fought against this strategy 
and committed serious human rights violations in 
this connection by shooting some mayors. Ger-
man development cooperation thus supported the 
struggle against the uprising and encouraged 
manifestations of violence. 
Creation of Material Incentives and Encourage-
ment of Clientelist Structures 
Development cooperation measures often encour-
age clientelist structures and mechanisms for self-
enrichment and corruption at national, regional 
and local level. They thus have the effect of exac-
erbating any potential for conflict and violence. 
Various measures in El Salvador and Kenya have 
shown development cooperation acting in this 
way. 
In El Salvador it was clear that commodity aid, 
which accounted for a large proportion of German 
development cooperation while Duarte was in 
power, provided certain Christian Democratic 
politicians with opportunities to line their own 
pockets. The growing corruption was one of the 
main reasons for the absence of consolidation and 
thus the failure of the Christian Democratic Party. 
In Kenya a settlement project can be taken as an 
example of how the inflow of resources through a 
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project may increase the rivalry for the goods and 
privileges that have to be distributed at local level. 
As local rivalries corresponded to the political 
rivalries at national level, the project activities 
were increasingly seen by the local population as 
making for one-sided privileges or discrimination 
and so helped to polarize the people. The measure 
also helped to encourage the local clientele sys-
tem, there being few ways of preventing corrup-
tion. 
Increase in Disparities 
In some cases development cooperation measures 
have helped to increase disparities. An increase in 
disparities can be detected, for example, as re-
gards ethnic groups, party political behaviour in 
regional elections and settlement areas. Develop-
ment cooperation measures were found to have an 
unintended impact of this kind in El Salvador, 
Rwanda and Sri Lanka. 
A fund originally intended to provide for the so-
cial cushioning of economic structural adjustment 
in El Salvador and supported by German financial 
cooperation was at times conducive to conflict, 
since allocations depended on the various com-
munes voting the "right" way. 
German assistance (technical cooperation and fi-
nancial cooperation after the genocide) for the 
state-owned Radio Rwanda exacerbated the con-
flict. The problem with this measure was that the 
German assistance led to the creation of an in-
strument for polarization and confrontation over 
whose use there is no control. The simultaneous 
training of journalists, for example, might con-
ceivably have had a conflict-reducing effect. 
A settlement project in Rwanda in which German 
development cooperation was involved had im-
pacts that directly exacerbated the conflict. The 
location had already been seen as a suitable place 
for settlement on environmental and technical 
grounds before the war. After the war a refugee 
camp for Tutsis from the Masisi was set up there. 
This was, however, Habyarimana's home region, 
which became a war zone after the return of the 
          
  
Box 6: Conflict Exacerbation by Development Cooper-
ation: the Mahaweli Programme in Sri Lanka 
Since the 1930s and especially the 1940s resettlement 
projects have been implemented in Sri Lanka to alleviate 
the growing shortage of land in the south-west, where the 
population is largely Sinhalese. Sri Lanka's Tamils have 
opposed these projects because they threaten to change the 
ethnic majority in the provinces concerned to the 
disadvantage of the Tamils and Muslims. With the 
Mahaweli project, which has been planned since the 1960s 
and consists of a large number of subsidiary energy 
generation projects, the country's largest scheme was 
launched, the aim being to use at least 74 % of the settled 
area – where Tamils previously formed the majority of the 
population – for Sinhalese. 
The Sinhalese settlement projects became one of the deci-
sive motivating factors in the Tamils' resistance. This is 
not least evident from the many attacks on colonies of new 
Sinhalese settlers during the civil war. As the Tamils and 
now the LTTE see it, the settlement policy is one of the 
main causes of the civil war. 
The international donor community has supported the 
Mahaweli project since 1977. The Federal Republic of 
Germany contributed large loans to the financing of two 
dams forming part of the overall project (Randenigala: 
DM 400 m; Rantembe: DM 230 m); one loan agreement 
was signed before, the other after the outbreak of the civil 
war. 
For a long time Germany did not see the ethnically ori-
ented settlement policy underlying the Mahaweli project 
as a particular problem. As late as September 1983 the 
Federal Government stated in its written answer to a ques-
tion raised in the Bundestag that the project had no dis-
cernible implications for the conflict between Tamils and 
Sinhalese. The settlement policy was financed and imple-
mented by the Sri Lankan government entirely on its own 
responsibility. 
In the early 1990s some donors (especially Norway, Can-
ada and the World Bank) began looking critically at their 
own development cooperation policies in the context of 
the Mahaweli project. 
new refugees in February 1997. The local popula-
tion saw the planned settlement as a provocation: 
the camp was eventually attacked twice. 
Resettlement projects forming part of energy gen-
eration schemes have been used by the govern-
ment in Sri Lanka on a large scale in the past to 
change the ethnic majority in some parts of the 
country to the disadvantage of the Tamil people. 
The Sinhalese settlement projects became a deci-
sive motivating factor in the Tamil resistance and 
so a cause of the conflict. As part of the largest 
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energy generation programme ("Mahaweli") Ger-
man development cooperation became involved in 
the financing of dam construction projects without 
adequate account being taken of the problems 
posed by a settlement policy that caused conflict. 
Inconsistent Impacts of Resource-related Meas-
ures 
Many measures associated with resource use and 
distribution are relevant to conflicts. This is par-
ticularly true of land use projects and related is-
sues.28 
Such projects may have both positive and nega-
tive impacts. Irrigation projects, for example, 
make land use in an area more attractive. As soon 
as land becomes scarce through the influx of new 
settlers, groups that have traditionally occupied 
the area often claim it for themselves. This leads 
to conflicts, which may become violent (e.g. 
Ethiopia). 
Other Measures 
A project activity forming part of German techni-
cal cooperation in Ethiopia probably exacerbated 
the border conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea. 
The Ethiopian government produced a map of the 
Tigré region in which the border was shown as it 
had been before the colonial period and so did not 
correspond to the internationally recognized bor-
der. The map was financed by a GTZ project and 
also bore the GTZ logo. It is impossible to gauge 
any impact due to the existence of the map or its 
significance as a cause of the war. It may, how-
ever, have been a factor that exacerbated the con-
flict in the unstable situation in Eritrean-Ethiopian 
relations, because it was known to the Eritrean 
government. 
                                                     
28 See also the regional development programmes in 
Kenya, for example. 
4.3 Impacts and Special Features of 
Individual Instruments 
Besides the findings on the impacts of German 
development cooperation at macro and project 
level, some additional findings on individual Ger-
man development cooperation instruments can be 
presented. The main aim is to identify the special 
features and the strengths and weaknesses of in-
struments and the agencies concerned as far as the 
country evaluations allow. 
Policy Dialogue and Conditionality 
Policy dialogue and conditionality must be re-
garded as being particularly important for conflict 
situations and as having a high impact potential 
where a multilateral agreement is reached on the 
approach to be adopted; this is especially true of 
the phases before conflicts become acute and vio-
lent (open confrontation phase). 
The impacts are most clearly discernible in 
Kenya's case, despite the stop-go process. Here 
the coordinated approach adopted by most of the 
leading donors was a crucial requirement for the 
high level of effectiveness. 
Conversely, the initial situation in El Salvador and 
Rwanda, where there was an excess of develop-
ment cooperation ("over-aiding"), was unfavour-
able for an effective policy dialogue. Develop-
ment cooperation needs to be kept on a relatively 
short rein if conditionality is to be effective. 
The country studies on Ethiopia, Rwanda and Sri 
Lanka implicitly and explicitly reveal that, if the 
policy dialogue had been more clear-cut and had 
set out more concrete demands and conditions, it 
would have had the potential to influence the con-
flict situation more effectively. 
Financial and Technical Cooperation 
Financial and technical cooperation have a num-
ber of specific features that may be relevant to 
conflicts. They include the following: 
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Box 7: Factors Determining the Success of the Policy 
Dialogue and Conditionality in Kenya 
In Kenya's case various reasons can be given for the pro-
nounced effectiveness of the policy dialogue and condi-
tionality: 
1. the existence of strong internal forces fighting for a 
democratic multi-party system; the intervention from 
outside in support of the opposition forces merely 
tipped the balance, 
2. Kenya's heavy dependence on development coopera-
tion resources, 
3. the country's waning strategic importance after the end 
of the East-West conflict, 
4. the coordinated approach adopted by almost all lead-
ing donor countries (exception: France). 
— Governments (e.g. Ethiopia) are obviously far 
more interested in financial cooperation than 
in other forms of (German) development co-
operation. This is particularly due to the fact 
that financial cooperation gives governments 
more flexibility in the use of resources. Fur-
thermore, financial cooperation tends to entail 
the presence of fewer donor personnel in the 
country than other development cooperation 
instruments. 
— With partner governments so interested in fi-
nancial cooperation, it is likely to be particu-
larly suitable for the formulation of effective 
conditions (policy dialogue and condition-
ality). 
— Commodity aid may pose particularly serious 
problems under conflict conditions. 
— Technical cooperation can be controlled fairly 
well throughout the project or programme cy-
cle, greater influence on individual project 
and programme components thus usually be-
ing possible. 
— Technical cooperation usually has a good ex-
ternal structure; it can therefore continue or 
begin to operate even under relatively unsta-
ble conditions. 
In addition, the fungibility of development coop-
eration may pose a problem for both financial and 
technical cooperation; in other words, develop-
ment cooperation tends to ease the pressure on the 
government concerned to perform certain tasks (in 
social sectors, for example), thus possibly ena-
bling it to use resources for other activities (which 
may be inappropriate to development or in a con-
flict situation). 
Non-governmental Activities 
The particular strength of non-governmental de-
velopment cooperation in conflict situations is 
emphasized by the studies on Ethiopia, El Salva-
dor, Kenya and Sri Lanka. Important findings in 
this context are that: 
— NGOs are sometimes able to take appropriate 
conflict-related action in phases or areas 
where this would be impossible for official 
development cooperation; 
— the substantive profile (criticism of the re-
gime, etc.) of NGOs is often far clearer than 
that of official development cooperation; 
— the Political Foundations play a very impor-
tant role in the social policy sphere, espe-
cially compared to financial and technical co-
operation; 
— the work of the Political Foundations very 
much depends on whether they are able to 
find or develop appropriate counterpart struc-
tures; 
— the Churches in particular have very good 
local interlocutors in many countries and are 
very sensitive to the local situation. 
4.4 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions 
In the past the impacts of German development 
cooperation of relevance to conflicts were hardly 
recorded or considered. This is especially true of 
unintended impacts at both macro and project 
level. There are no criteria to enable relevance to 
conflicts to be identified quickly. 
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An analysis of the impacts of German develop-
ment cooperation on potential and actual conflict 
situations produces a heterogeneous picture. A 
wide variety of positive and negative impacts at 
macro and project level can be identified. The 
links are complex. German development coopera-
tion as a whole and individual measures often 
have both positive and negative impacts. 
Although the impacts of German development 
cooperation should not be overrated, some rele-
vant findings can nonetheless be borne in mind. 
Positive tendencies can probably be increased and 
negative tendencies reduced if more thought is 
given to the way the actors involved operate in 
terms of relevance to conflicts. 
At macro level a particularly important factor is 
that development cooperation often has the effect 
of stabilizing the regime and so intentionally or 
unintentionally supports one party to a conflict. 
This may have consequences that exacerbate the 
conflict. 
At project level there are options for developing 
positive impacts in conflict situations. It is equally 
important, however, for the unintended negative 
consequences possibly associated with develop-
ment cooperation measures to be recognized and 
removed. 
Recommendations 
⇒ More deliberate use should be made of Ger-
man development cooperation for strategic 
purposes in conflict situations, so that better 
account may be taken and a better assessment 
made of the general positive and negative im-
pacts it has (assessment of political conse-
quences). 
⇒ The negative impacts that German develop-
ment cooperation as a whole may have in 
various countries should form the basis for 
deliberations (related primarily to the BMZ, 
FO, GTZ and KfW) on whether and, if so, 
where general changes (promotion of certain 
countries, instruments, concepts, procedures) 
are appropriate and feasible. The negative 
impact areas should be systematically ana-
lysed from this angle. 
⇒ The instruments of German development co-
operation should be used more purposefully 
against the background of a country's conflict 
situation. Where the government is involved 
in the conflict and pursues a repressive policy 
that exacerbates it, serious thought should be 
given to terminating development coopera-
tion or changing the instruments used. Spe-
cific conditions – at sectoral and project level, 
for example – may be an appropriate option. 
⇒ Efforts should be made to analyse the positive 
impacts of individual conflict-specific meas-
ures to see if they can be applied to other 
suitable countries. 
⇒ At the level of individual measures efforts 
should be made (primarily by the BMZ, GTZ 
and KfW) to make a systematic analysis of 
positive and negative impacts relevant to con-
flicts (conflict impact assessment) and to take 
account of the findings at every stage of 
planning, implementation and monitoring/ 
evaluation.29 
⇒ In development cooperation measures ac-
count should always be taken not only of 
technical aspects but also of relevance to con-
flicts, since no project is in fact purely techni-
cal. 
⇒ The largely positive conflict-related work of 
NGOs should be discussed (by the BMZ and 
appropriate NGOs) in terms of the question 
whether there are appropriate openings for 
assistance in conflict situations in addition to 
the existing options and instruments. 
⇒ The BMZ should ask the leading international 
development cooperation institutions whether 
they analyse the impacts of conflicts ade-
quately and take account of them in their 
conceptual and operational approaches. 
                                                     
29 References to conflict impact assessment can be found in 
Bush (1998). 
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5 Special Features of Development 
Cooperation in Conflict Situations 
5.1 Flexibility and Willingness to Ac-
cept Responsibility and to Take 
Risks 
The country evaluations (e.g. El Salvador, Mali, 
Sri Lanka) clearly indicate that in conflict situa-
tions development cooperation must demonstrate 
a particular degree of flexibility if it is to be effec-
tive and successful. This flexibility is needed in 
various respects of relevance to planning and im-
plementation: 
— Rapid action at the right time: It is often nec-
essary to react very quickly to conflict situa-
tions with development cooperation meas-
ures.30 This is true, for example, when the po-
litical circumstances in a country change (in-
crease in repression, etc.) or the aim is to help 
stabilize certain areas in the short term (as in 
northern Mali or on the Jaffna peninsula in 
Sri Lanka). Particularly important in this con-
text is the willingness and ability to take early 
action in post-war countries or in areas where 
hostilities have been brought to an end (post-
conflict preparedness). 
— Working in an unstable environment: A fea-
ture of conflict situations is a high degree of 
instability. Development cooperation actors 
wanting to operate in such situations must 
therefore be prepared for a lack of security 
(as in Mali and Sri Lanka). 
— Counterparts: The often exclusive or heavy 
concentration of official development coop-
eration on government counterparts may be 
problematical or even unsuitable in conflict 
situations (as in Ethiopia and El Salvador). 
                                                     
30 It should be emphasized, however, that conflict-related 
action in the context of development cooperation cannot 
and should not consist solely of short-term measures. 
Reference should be made, for example, to the opportu-
nities for having a long-term impact on the causes of 
conflicts. 
— Instruments: Conflict situations often call for 
a "broad" approach because, for example, not 
only infrastructure measures but also addi-
tional social activities are needed and suitable 
counterparts are not available. In principle, it 
is therefore necessary to ensure effective in-
teraction of various instruments (financial, 
technical and human resources cooperation) 
(as in Mali) or to look for ways of making in-
dividual forms of project more flexible; ex-
perience of technical cooperation with "open 
funds" may be a basis for further deliberation. 
 
Box 8: Factors Determining the Success of the 
"Northern Mali Programme" 
Various factors can be said to have determined the particu-
lar success of the "Northern Mali Programme". They in-
clude: 
– Timing and nature of the measure: The programme 
was operational at a very early stage. It was ready at 
the time when support for basic needs, reconciliation 
and the return of the refugees and displaced persons 
became politically possible. 
– Efficiency and aptitude of the programme team: The 
programme coordination team is small (two German 
and one Malian staff member), covers various disci-
plines and is technically and socially competent. 
– Use of different development cooperation instruments: 
No strict distinction was made between emergency aid 
and development cooperation; the activities were de-
ployed flexibly. Technical cooperation, financial co-
operation, food aid, emergency aid and aid for refu-
gees complemented one another. 
– Visible success: The programme was seen to be suc-
cessful within a short time; this was also due to the 
support of multilateral institutions. 
– Participation and transparency: Those directly con-
cerned were involved as far as possible in the plan-
ning, negotiation and implementation of all project 
components. 
– Autonomy: The programme largely enjoys administra-
tive and substantive autonomy as regards its integra-
tion into the Malian organizational structure. 
– Decentralized implementation: The programme activi-
ties are undertaken through scattered bases, which are 
managed by local personnel and operate largely on 
their own responsibility. 
– Regional investment: The programme had particular 
recourse to locally available labour-intensive tech-
nologies and local enterprises. 
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— Making the procedures more flexible: It is 
therefore advisable to make the procedural 
stages connected with applications, project 
approval and project implementation more 
flexible. 
In certain cases flexibility may entail higher risks 
than is the case with normal development coop-
eration. Willingness to accept responsibility and 
to take risks concerns various aspects. There are 
development policy risks, since objectives in con-
flict situations may, for example, be inconsistent 
with the principle of sustainability and the part-
nership idea (see below). The general risk of a 
measure failing completely or having to be sus-
pended because a conflict has come to a head is 
also far higher than in other forms of development 
cooperation. Finally, there may be a particular 
security risk for domestic and foreign develop-
ment cooperation personnel. 
5.2 Procedures 
Potential or actual conflict situations are not sys-
tematically referred to or appraised in German 
development cooperation procedures. The frame-
works of the following stages in the BMZ's and 
implementing agencies' procedures, for example, 
have so far taken little or no account of the con-
flict dimension (as in the question of effects/side-
effects on potential and actual conflict situations): 
— tendering for the implementation of projects, 
— project progress reviews, 
— review reports and final appraisals, 
— evaluations, 
— BMZ country concepts, 
— "five development cooperation criteria" (e.g. 
the dimension "the warring parties' desire for 
peace"). 
5.3 Development Policy Principles 
Development cooperation in conflict situations 
may lead to conflicts between objectives and de-
velopment policy principles. This primarily con-
cerns two principles: that of "sustainability" and 
that of the "partnership idea" (or ownership). 
— Under certain conflict conditions the principle 
of sustainability must of necessity play a dif-
ferent role from the one it plays in develop-
ment cooperation under normal conditions. 
Conflict situations may make it necessary to 
pursue short-term objectives (such as the sta-
bilization of a region) without seeking or 
achieving the degree of sustainability that is 
usually called for. Conflict-induced risks 
(such as the danger of armed conflict perhaps 
returning to a region) may threaten the sus-
tainability of measures. 
— The idea of partnership and the principle of 
the highest possible level of ownership may, 
where a conflict is concerned, also play a 
subordinate role or require redefinition. In the 
case of repressive regimes and in civil war 
situations where the government is itself a 
warring party the idea of partnership and the 
principle of ownership is not only threatened 
but would in most cases produce results that 
were undesirable in development terms and 
exacerbate the conflict. The problem in this 
context is that in official development coop-
eration the partnership idea and the owner-
ship principle are primarily geared to coop-
eration with governments and state agencies 
and do not yet involve many actors in civil 
society. This is also true, for example, of the 
selection of counterparts. 
5.4 Coordination with Other Donors 
Various examples show that the success of con-
flict-related development cooperation very much 
depends on satisfactory donor coordination. The 
joint policy dialogue between the donor countries 
and Kenya was one of the main determinants of 
success. What is very important in this context is 
that the donors formulated specific and verifiable 
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requirements. A major barrier to be overcome if a 
joint policy dialogue is to be effective is an excess 
of development cooperation ("over-aiding"), 
which leaves no incentive to adjust behaviour 
(e.g. El Salvador and Rwanda). 
Thematic donor groups "on the spot" may make 
an important contribution. In Kenya an informal 
donor group (Democratic Development Group) 
repeatedly took action through press releases, 
memoranda, letters to the President, etc. In Ethio-
pia a consultative group of ambassadors repeat-
edly intervened in political activities. 
The country evaluations (e.g. El Salvador and Sri 
Lanka) similarly emphasize the need for adequate 
donor coordination at sectoral and project level. 
Some references (El Salvador and Sri Lanka) in-
dicate that a multilateral institution should play a 
special role in donor coordination in conflict sit-
uations. 
5.5 German Development Cooperation 
in Conflict Situations: the Influence 
of Other German Policies 
The country evaluations contain various refer-
ences to other German policies which, like devel-
opment cooperation, influence potential and actual 
conflict situations. Not least because there is usu-
ally little external influence, an effective German 
development cooperation strategy geared to con-
flict situations depends on the policies concerned 
being implemented as coherently as possible. 
The country evaluations reveal points of contact 
with other areas of German policy: 
— Role of German foreign policy: German for-
eign policy exercises the most obvious influ-
ence because it is responsible for German 
policy towards other countries; this is not 
least true of crisis and conflict situations. 
 In this context two features of German for-
eign policy can be identified in the country 
evaluations. Firstly, it must be assumed in 
some cases that German foreign policy – and 
so German development cooperation's room 
for manoeuvre – are essentially or largely de-
termined by the foreign policies of third 
countries (especially the USA, France and 
Britain). This is true, for example, of Ethio-
pia, El Salvador, Mali and Rwanda.31 Sec-
ondly, some of the country evaluations em-
phasize the low profile of German foreign 
policy as regards diplomatic initiatives aimed 
at preventing crises or resolving conflicts. 
This primarily concerns Mali and Sri Lanka. 
In Sri Lanka there might have been other op-
portunities for using explicitly conflict-
related measures (especially on the Jaffna 
peninsula) as the basis for diplomatic initia-
tives. 
— Foreign activities financing the military ac-
tivities of opposition groups and liberation 
movements / asylum: Activities abroad evi-
dently play a major role in the financing of 
the LTTE's part in the Sri Lankan civil war. 
Germany and other western countries are 
very important in this context. It is considered 
certain that the blackmailing of Tamils in 
Germany is a major source of funds for the 
LTTE. As the Sri Lankan government sees it, 
the asylum granted by Germany supports this 
source of funds for the LTTE, since asylum is 
the basis on which most Tamils emigrate to 
Germany. 
5.6 Perception of German Develop-
ment Cooperation 
The country evaluations (e.g. El Salvador and Sri 
Lanka) show that German development coopera-
tion in conflict situations can never be "neutral" or 
purely technical. If only because of its regional 
orientation or choice of target groups, develop-
ment cooperation runs the risk of supporting one 
party to a conflict or at least of being perceived as 
lacking balance. As a general rule there is there-
fore a potential danger of German (and other) de-
                                                     
31 See sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
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velopment cooperation being exposed to consid-
erable animosity from one party to the conflict. 
In principle, official German development coop-
eration is designed to support governments as par-
ties to conflicts, since they are the partners in offi-
cial development cooperation. An attempt can be 
made to include certain offsetting elements 
through the shaping of the policy dialogue and 
conditionality and of individual measures. 
Despite the fundamental danger of tending to sup-
port the government as a warring party, German 
development cooperation has largely succeeded in 
being perceived as not excessively partial but as 
relatively balanced. This can be said, for example, 
of Sri Lanka and El Salvador, where German de-
velopment cooperation (in favour of the Duarte 
government) was deemed to be well-intentioned 
by most interviewees. In Mali German develop-
ment cooperation was not suspected by the groups 
that supported the government of wanting to insti-
gate a conflict with the Tuareg, nor was Germany 
accused of being hostile to the Tuareg. 
This is not to say that there was no criticism at all; 
at the last donors' meeting in Paris, for example, 
the donor community was urged by the LTTE to 
stop development cooperation in favour of the Sri 
Lankan government. Certain German develop-
ment cooperation projects are regarded by the 
government as "Tamil projects". 
In Ethiopia, on the other hand, more fundamental 
criticism is levelled by opposition groups at Ger-
man development cooperation for what they see 
as excessive support for the dictatorial govern-
ment. 
5.7 Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions 
Development cooperation in conflict situations 
has special features and calls for a specific ap-
proach. The special features very largely concern 
unstable and changing conditions and require-
ments in the countries affected by conflict. 
If development cooperation is to be effective and 
conflict-related, 
— a high degree of flexibility, 
— a greater willingness to accept responsibility 
and to take risks, 
— changed procedures, and 
— qualifications as regards the principle of sus-
tainability and partnership 
are needed. 
It is very important for there to be adequate donor 
coordination at a general level (especially at donor 
meetings in Paris) and at the level of individual 
thematic "on-the-spot" donor groups and of spe-
cific measures if the efforts of an individual donor 
are not to fall flat or to be foiled by other donors. 
Only if a sufficient number of relevant donors is 
prepared to take conflict-related action does de-
velopment cooperation have a chance to bring 
positive influence to bear on potential and actual 
conflict situations. 
It is also necessary for it to be considered under 
the prevailing conditions whether other policies 
can support possible conflict-related efforts by 
German development cooperation actors or per-
haps counteract them. In principle, foreign policy 
has a special role to play in this context. 
It should also be emphasized that the perception 
of German development cooperation is vitally im-
portant. As a rule, official development coopera-
tion tends to support one party to a conflict – the 
government – directly and indirectly. 
Recommendations 
⇒ The procedures and instruments of German 
development cooperation should be reviewed 
to see whether they are sufficiently flexible in 
conflict situations and permit prompt reaction 
and, where appropriate, they should be ad-
justed. 
⇒ Existing opportunities for cooperation with 
non-governmental counterparts in the context 
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of official development cooperation should be 
clarified; it may be necessary to develop new 
forms of cooperation with actors in civil soci-
ety. A particular option here is direct assis-
tance for local NGOs or their activities. 
⇒ In conflict situations measures that permit a 
broad and open approach (along the lines of 
"open funds", for example) are especially 
suitable for meeting a wide range of require-
ments. 
⇒ There is a need for the policy sphere (BMZ 
and FO) to show greater willingness to accept 
responsibility and to take risks in the context 
of development cooperation in conflict situa-
tions. 
⇒ Conceptually, general development policy 
principles (principles of sustainability and 
partnership/ownership) need to be adjusted 
under conflict conditions. In conflict-related 
development cooperation other, short-term 
considerations may appropriately take the 
forefront and be acceptable and necessary in 
development policy terms. 
⇒ German development cooperation provides 
openings for foreign policy to play a more ac-
tive role in some cases (specific crisis preven-
tion and conflict resolution initiatives). 
⇒ In conflict situations German development 
cooperation can never be neutral or purely 
technical. However, it must endeavour not to 
act partially or to be perceived as acting par-
tially. As a matter of principle cooperation 
with the government concerned should there-
fore always be analysed in conflict situations. 
6 General Conclusions and Recom-
mendations 
More Political Conception of Development Coop-
eration in Countries Affected by Conflicts 
The development cooperation community's self-
image in conflict situations is of paramount im-
portance. A conception reduced to technical prob-
lems and operational approaches derived from it 
run the risk of exacerbating conflicts. Develop-
ment cooperation is political, serves interests in 
the various countries and is therefore never neu-
tral. 
⇒ The role of development cooperation in con-
flict situations needs to be singled out for dis-
cussion within the BMZ and especially the 
implementing agencies. The institutions in-
volved should be encouraged to engage in 
"more political" thinking, which will help to 
make for the better recognition and assess-
ment of the risks and strengths of German 
development cooperation in countries af-
fected by conflicts at macro level, with regard 
to individual sectors and regions and practical 
measures. 
Training of Development Cooperation Personnel 
Development cooperation in conflict situations 
places new demands on the institutions involved. 
Whether these demands can be appropriately met 
very much depends on whether the staff are ade-
quately prepared for these tasks and their job 
specifications are appropriate. 
⇒ Suitable opportunities for training32 in "de-
velopment cooperation in conflict situations" 
should be available for the staff of the BMZ, 
FO and implementing agencies. Similar train-
ing should be developed for seconded devel-
opment cooperation personnel (experts, de-
velopment workers, etc.). The job specifica-
tions given when posts are advertised and 
new staff are recruited should also be re-
viewed along these lines. 
Substantive Responsibility within the BMZ 
Within the BMZ there is no substantive assign-
ment of "crisis prevention and conflict resolution 
in development cooperation" to a specialized or 
sectoral department. It is currently the responsibil-
ity of the "Principles Section" (Section 04). The 
                                                     
32 See, for example, the material for the EU training pro-
gramme: Engel / Mehler (1999). 
Impact of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations 41 
place it has been assigned in the ministry does not 
reflect the importance of this area of responsibil-
ity. There are also organizational problems when 
different regional desks are affected by a conflict 
situation.33 
The country evaluations emphasize the need for a 
separate organizational unit within the BMZ. Im-
portant questions in this context are: 
— Is the creation of a new organizational unit 
meant primarily to send a political signal to 
the public? 
— If this organizational unit is set up, will it 
primarily perform specialist tasks outside the 
BMZ for the FO and implementing agencies? 
— If this organizational unit is set up, will it 
primarily perform a cross-section task within 
the BMZ (similar to "environment" or "gen-
der")? 
— Will "development cooperation in conflict 
situations" have a better chance of influenc-
ing other BMZ service units if established 
within the existing structures or separately? 
— How many staff can be made available to per-
form these tasks? 
In principle, various forms of task assignment are 
conceivable. A development policy crisis centre 
as a staff unit attached to the Minister's office, a 
specialized section, assignment to an existing sec-
tion or the retention of the current structure, but 
with more staff to cover the new responsibilities, 
might be basic options. 
⇒ In view of the importance of these tasks, the 
substance needs to be upgraded and estab-
lished as a "cross-section task". If it is to have 
effective influence on the regional desks and 
implementing agencies in particular, the unit 
should be established as a specialized section. 
It should be a new unit that also covers other 
socio-political areas (above all, "democracy" 
                                                     
33 As in the case of the multidimensional conflict in 
Rwanda, where various neighbouring countries played a 
major role and different regional desks were responsible. 
and "human rights"). Concentration on short-
term tasks, which would tend to be associated 
with assignment to Section 305 (food aid, 
emergency aid and aid for refugees; World 
Food Programme/WFP), should be avoided. 
Conceptual Work and Other Substantive  
Approaches 
The experience gained during the country evalua-
tions shows development cooperation to have a 
major conceptual need in the area of crisis preven-
tion and conflict resolution. Documents published 
by the BMZ and DAC have been able to provide 
important indications in this context. Questions 
concerning, in particular, country strategies, sec-
tors and spheres and individual measures and ba-
sic principles have still to be answered, however. 
⇒ The BMZ should continue to oversee the sub-
ject conceptually and to support appropriate 
initiatives at international level (DAC, indi-
vidual multilateral donors). 
⇒ The BMZ should identify other approaches 
yet to be adopted so that it may use conflict-
specific measures effectively. The following 
areas, for example, might act as links: 
— openings for collective trauma counsel-
ling, 
— problem-solving capacities of national 
and local actors, 
— "violence" as a point of departure and 
cross-section topic for development coop-
eration. 
⇒ The BMZ's country concepts should take suf-
ficient analytical account of conflict situa-
tions, particularly with a view to establishing 
crisis prevention and conflict resolution strat-
egies. 
Division of Labour between German Development 
Cooperation and Multilateral Institutions 
It must be assumed that the concentration of bilat-
eral German development cooperation is appro-
priate if as extensive know-how as possible is to 
be developed and comparative advantages of mul-
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tilateral institutions are to be exploited in conflict 
situations. 
⇒ German development cooperation should 
seek a division of labour in the area of crisis 
prevention and conflict resolution so as to ex-
ploit its own advantages or make purposeful 
use of the advantages of multilateral institu-
tions. Guidelines (tasks for German bilateral 
development cooperation, tasks for multilat-
eral development cooperation) should be 
drawn up to this end. 
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III Annex 
Re: Evaluation of "Impact of Development Co-operation in Crisis Situations" 
 in particular: Terms of Reference 
These terms of reference are also to be taken as a framework structure for the evaluation report that is to be 
submitted. 
 
I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
1. Reason for the Evaluation 
Substantive debate on the contribution develop-
ment co-operation can make to stable and peace-
ful development in conflicts and crises is at a very 
advanced stage: At the beginning of May, the 
OECD High Level Meeting adopted a detailed 
document on the subject and on 3 June 1997, Min-
ister Spranger presented our thoughts on the mat-
ter to the press (in the brochure "BMZ aktuell"). 
A great deal of experience has been gathered 
through projects that have been implemented in 
various different areas and that must be regarded 
as contributing to crisis prevention (e.g. demobili-
sation, food aid, etc.). In some countries, efforts 
are gradually being made to incorporate elements 
of crisis prevention into projects or programmes. 
As yet, however, no empirical studies are avail-
able regarding the role that has been, or could be, 
played by development co-operation as a whole in 
actual conflicts and crises or regarding the condi-
tions that must exist if development co-operation 
is to be successful in helping prevent crises. 
In this context, a "crisis" is defined as a situation 
in which social conflict is carried out using violent 
means. 
2. Objective of the Evaluation 
The aim of the evaluation is to achieve a clear pic-
ture of the role played by development co-
operation in social conflicts and crises to date – in 
terms of both averting and defusing them. The 
conditions necessary if development co-operation 
is to be successful in preventing crises are to be 
identified. Here, an assessment should be made of 
the interplay of the various instruments within the 
overall development co-operation programme. 
It should be investigated what political and eco-
nomic conditions are required if development co-
operation is to be successful and the limits of what 
development co-operation can achieve. 
These questions should be tackled empirically by 
means of several case studies.  
The following documents in particular provide the 
analytical basis for the assessment: 
— BMZ aktuell "Entwicklungszusammenarbeit 
und Krisenvorbeugung" 
— current research project on "crisis indicators" 
— OECD/DAC: "DAC Guidelines on Conflict, 
Peace and Development Co-operation". 
These documents detail the possible causes of 
conflict and also those areas that are regarded as 
important with respect to crisis prevention. Here, 
it must be assumed that there is, in fact, a connec-
tion between these areas (e.g. political participa-
tion or the use of natural resources) and the stabil-
ity or violent nature of development in a particular 
country or region. 
The case studies are to be used to investigate the 
extent to which development co-operation instru-
ments (bilateral development co-operation pro-
jects and programmes in the form of financial co-
operation, technical co-operation or technical co-
operation in the broader sense (promotion of non-
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governmental organisations), political dialogue) 
contributed to limiting the potential for crisis or, 
by influencing social mechanisms, ensuring that 
conflicts were resolved peacefully. A further im-
portant aspect is the investigation into the uninten-
tional influence development co-operation and its 
instruments may have in alleviating or aggravat-
ing conflicts, since "crisis prevention" as such has 
not to date been a declared aim of programmes or 
projects.  
Whilst the overall political context and the activi-
ties of other donors (including multilateral donors) 
and other players cannot be a focus of the investi-
gation, these are factors that must be taken into 
account in the analysis. 
3. Methodology of the Investigation 
For gathering information: 
— Country and project files at the BMZ, GTZ 
and KfW, both those concerning official de-
velopment co-operation and those dealing 
with NGO projects 
— Generally available publications (newspapers, 
academic reports, etc.) 
— Interviews within Germany with the Federal 
Foreign Office, those involved in official de-
velopment co-operation at all levels, those in-
volved in non-state development co-operation 
and representatives of relevant research insti-
tutes  
— Interviews in the field with embassies and 
those involved in development co-operation 
— Interviews in the field with representatives of 
conflicting parties and the government 
For analysing the impact of development co-
operation  
— Interviews and plausibility analysis. 
On this basis, an assessment can be made of 
whether and to what extent development co-
operation in general and/or the individual project 
activities in particular can help to influence or de-
fuse the specific potential for violence.  
4. Period of the Investigation 
The period of the investigation should be deter-
mined individually for each case study, depending 
on the way the conflict is developing and the in-
volvement of our development co-operation. 
5. Composition of the Evaluation group 
6. Involvement of the Partner Country in 
the Evaluation 
II. SUMMARY 
2.1 Major conclusions 
2.2 Major recommendations (indication of to 
whom recommendations are directed) 
III. FRAMEWORK CONDITIONS 
An investigation is to be undertaken into the ex-
tent to which framework conditions in the country 
in question were conducive or detrimental to the 
efforts to avert a crisis undertaken by develop-
ment co-operation during the conflict.  
3.1 The causes and the evolution of the crisis or 
conflict in the region under investigation are to be 
described. This description should be comple-
mented by an analysis, based on the crisis indica-
tors identified in the current research project. 
These take the form of political, economic, social 
and socio-cultural factors in the partner country 
and the region (e.g. human rights situation, degree 
of legal certainty, participatory rights of the popu-
lation (according to gender), the economic and 
social order). 
3.2 In the concrete instances being examined, 
an investigation should be undertaken into what 
particularly important framework conditions in-
fluenced the success or failure of attempts to 
tackle the conflict. These include: 
— the political will of the conflicting parties 
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— the political will of the government in the 
developing country  
— the influence of policy areas other than de-
velopment policy 
— the activities of other actors in development 
and other fields at national and international 
level and the co-ordination between them (or 
lack of it) 
3.3 Analysis of the institutional framework 
conditions (specifying their relevance for the suc-
cess of the project) 
Are there any institutions or groups working to-
wards the peaceful resolution of the conflict? Are 
they in contact with development co-operation? 
Are there any informal structures that could be 
used for this purpose? 
What chance is there of using local experts (in-
stead of seconded experts)? It should, in particu-
lar, be investigated what local forces could be 
used as neutral agencies or mediators (traditional 
conflict mediation, "new" authorities). Is it easier 
or more difficult for external observers to under-
stand conflicts? What particularly skills should 
they have? 
3.4 Identifying the consequences resulting from 
points 3.1 – 3.3. What general and specific condi-
tions had to be faced by development co-operation 
in the countries in question? What aspects must be 
regarded as restrictive (in these particular cases 
and in general)? 
IV. CONFLICT RECOGNITION AND THE 
FLOW OF INFORMATION 
In this area, it should be described what knowl-
edge those involved in development co-operation 
had of conflicts, their causes and their evolution. 
In this context, it is also interesting to examine 
whether they could in fact have acquired this 
knowledge, i.e. to what extent the available in-
formation was disregarded. At issue is, primarily, 
the kind of information that could easily have 
been obtained from project or embassy reports or 
from a general reading of the newspapers. 
Did those involved in development co-operation 
take note of existing conflicts, either actively or as 
affected parties, even if these did not occur in the 
project regions? How did those involved in devel-
opment co-operation learn of conflicts? To what 
extent did they actively examine or ignore the 
causes of the conflict? What mechanisms could be 
used to ensure that information is put to better 
use? 
Was there an information problem that prevented 
the conflict from being recognised? Did the dif-
ferent actors (field staff, GTZ/KfW, BMZ) have 
different levels of information, in other words was 
the flow of information obstructed? How could 
this flow of information be improved? 
Are the indicators identified through the crisis 
indicators research project suitable for early rec-
ognition of crisis in the particular country con-
cerned, or would they have been so? 
V. CONNECTION BETWEEN DEVELOP-
MENT CO-OPERATION AND CON-
FLICTS OR CRISES/ ANALYSIS OF 
PLANNING 
Was their any coincidental or intentional connec-
tion between the causes or the evolution of the 
crisis and development co-operation? 
What evidence is there that, in project/programme 
planning, conclusions were drawn from the 
knowledge of conflicts or their escalation and that 
these conclusions were applied to development 
co-operation (individual instruments or develop-
ment co-operation as a whole, including political 
dialogue)? Was an attempt made to use develop-
ment co-operation to solve the underlying prob-
lems, in other words were special projects or pro-
grammes formulated to tackle the causes of the 
crisis? 
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How did the application of the BMZ's five devel-
opment policy criteria influence co-operation in 
conflict situations? 
To what extent did development co-operation at-
tempt to influence the peaceful solution of the 
conflict? Was political dialogue used and/or con-
ditions stipulated in projects and programmes (this 
examination should be conducted on the basis of 
both documents on the preparation of government 
negotiations and summary records of these nego-
tiations)? Were social mechanisms for the peace-
ful resolution of conflict supported (participation, 
the legal system, arbitration in conflicts)? 
If this was not the case: would there have been 
any opportunity for development co-operation to 
become involved in this way? Would the analyti-
cal basis formulated in the BMZ aktuell "Entwick-
lungszusammenarbeit und Krisenvorbeugung" and 
in the "DAC Guidelines on conflict, peace and 
development co-operation" have identified ways 
in which conflict resolution and crisis aversion 
could have been tackled in the country concerned? 
VI. IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT CO-
OPERATION ON CONFLICTS AND 
THE EVOLUTION OF CONFLICTS 
In semi-open interviews, the following list of key 
words should be used to assess the impact of de-
velopment co-operation (or individual pro-
grammes and projects) in the specific conflict or 
crisis situation.  
I. Impact on long and medium-term causes of 
crisis 
1. Structural disparities 
1.1 Ecological, economic, political, cultural, 
regional disparities or marginalisation 
1.2 Dominance of certain groups 
1.3 Threat to physical existence 
2. Social awareness of conflict (recognition and 
articulation of opposing interests) 
3. Society’s willingness to pursue conflicts 
4. Pressure to modernise 
4.1 Serious changes in opportunities to gain 
political or economic power 
4.2 Impact of reforms on the competitive be-
haviour of groups or elites 
5. Collective perceptions of threat 
5.1 Collective negative scenarios 
5.2 Current parallels 
5.3 Mobilisation of “historical ideals” 
II. Impact of peaceful conflict resolution on so-
cial mechanisms 
1. Respect for human rights (constitution etc.) 
2. Participation of the population in the political 
process 
2.1 Access of the population to the state sys-
tem (benefits and posts) 
2.2 Transparency of state action 
2.3 Media 
2.4 Civil society’s activities 
2.5 Relations between state and citizens and 
groups (e.g. rules and regulations) 
2.6 Education system 
2.7 Decentralisation 
3. Legal system 
3.1 Independence of legal system 
3.2 Legislation 
3.3 Legal practice 
4. Role of police and the military 
4.1 Parliamentary controls 
4.2 Perception of role 
4.3 Size in relation to the country’s security 
needs 
Part I of this list corresponds to the indicators for 
analysing the causes of conflict that were identi-
fied in the “Crisis Indicators” project. Part II in-
cludes those factors that have a crucial impact on 
a society’s ability to adopt a peaceful attitude to 
conflict or tackle conflict in a peaceful way.  
Using this list, the following questions should be 
answered: Did development co-operation, either 
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as a whole or through individual projects, influ-
ence the areas mentioned and thus the causes of 
the conflict, its evolution and its possible escala-
tion? What significance did co-ordination/the in-
terplay of instruments have? Was it possible to 
abate the causes of the conflict or contribute to a 
peaceful resolution of the conflict? 
If the approach had been more targeted or the in-
struments combined into a package, is it likely 
some impact would have been achieved? 
Here, it should not only be considered whether an 
impact was achieved in terms of defusing the con-
flict, but also whether the conflict was aggravated. 
Did development co-operation as a whole or the 
individual projects serve to aggravate the conflict? 
The following hypothetical examples serve to il-
lustrate this problem: support for an educational 
system that practices ethnic discrimination, sup-
port for media (radio) that is misappropriated for 
particularist interests. It may well be impossible to 
ascertain whether such unintentional side-effects 
have occurred. For this reason, it would also be 
interesting to examine whether and to what extent 
control mechanisms that would preclude such an 
impact are built into projects (e.g. control of the 
subject matter, where financial co-operation is 
used to support the media, or control of teaching 
matter and teaching staff, where schools are given 
support).  
Overall assessment. 
VII. PARTICULAR CONDITIONS FOR 
DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION IN 
CONFLICT AND CRISIS SITUATIONS 
The question of the most appropriate time frame 
and a reasonable reaction time for development 
co-operation measures is of particular significance 
where crisis prevention projects are concerned. 
This also applies to the flexibility of the overall 
programme or of the individual measures, since it 
must be assumed that the prevailing conditions are 
more difficult than average and that there will be 
frequent and abrupt alterations in the political 
situation. Given these special conditions, is the 
existing range of instruments at all applicable? 
Are present procedures appropriate for dealing 
with such situations? 
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
— regarding the account taken of or influence 
exerted on framework conditions? (including 
partner government and other donors) 
— regarding the design/ application of develop-
ment co-operation, the combination of certain 
instruments? 
— regarding the adaptation of procedures 
— others 
IX. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
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